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Rectitude in International Arbitration

Everything is in flux.
Heracleitus 1
Righteousness endures forever.
Psalm 111 2
I. LEVEL PLAYING FIELDS
(a) Heracleitus Meets the Psalmist
THE SOMEWHAT excessive words attributed to Heracleitus find some
application in the current search for ethical standards applicable to arbitrators
sitting in international disputes. New patterns of misbehaviour create new types of
ethical challenges. Few criteria for evaluating arbitrator independence and
impartiality will likely stay foolproof for long, given how ingenious fools often
prove themselves to be.
Heracleitus notwithstanding, however, change does not occupy the entirety of
human experience. Although tomorrow cannot be built on an assumption of
yesterday's permanence, one must build on something. Yesterday's lessons remain
better starting points than most. Thus the aspirational model of righteousness
continues to manifest a stubborn stability, much as the Psalmist predicted.

1

2

Professor of Law, Boston University. Adapted from a symposium contribution published in (2009) 46 San Diego
L Rev. 629. Copyright © William W. Park, 2009 & 2011.
Transliterated panta rhei and attributed to Heracleitus of Ephesus (535-475 BCE) by Plato and Aristode, the
phrase likely derives from a statement that we never step twice into the same river because new waters flow on
us. See Heraclitus, The Cosmic Fragments 370-80 (G.S. Kirk (ed. and trans.), 1978). In Greek thought the idea is
an old one. By contrast, Hebrew and Christian scriptures often juxtapose human transience with divine
permanence. According to the prophet Isaiah, 'Allfleshis grass. . . The grass withers, the flower fades; but the
word of our God will stand forever'. Isaiah 40:6-8, as quoted in shortened form in 1 Peter 1:24-25.
The full text of Psalm 111, verse 3 reads, 'Full of honor and majesty is the Lord's work, and His righteousness
endures forever'.
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(b) Why Bias Matters
No one with a dog in the fight should judge the competition. 5 Nor should anyone
serve as a referee in a game after having decided which team will win. At least as
an aspirational model, legal claims should be decided on their merits, rather than
according to a predisposition or interest in the outcome. Consequently, few tasks
present the vital urgency of establishing standards for evaluating the independence
and impartiality of arbitrators. 6

4

5

The phrase 'transient and permanent' seems first to have appeared in a sermon by a New Englander named
Theodore Parker, delivered at the ordination of Charles Shackford in the Hawes Place Church in Boston in
May 1841. Theodore Parker, 'The Transient and Permanent in Christianity' in George Willis Cooke (ed.), The
Transient and Permanent in Christianity (1908), p. 447. The Unitarian preacher unsettled much of his community
by suggesting that the message of Jesus was valuable solely because of the truth it revealed, not due to any
divine credentials.
Important ethical questions related to legal counsel (how lawyers behave in international arbitration) remain
beyond the scope of this article. Such matters involve the propriety of interviewing witnesses (impermissible
under deontological principles of many European bar association rules) and the duty to abide by the mandates
of a lawyer's own jurisdiction when practising in connection with a foreign arbitration. See e.g., Model Rules
of Professional Conduct (2009), Rule 8.5 cmt 7 (providing that the choice of law provision applies to 'lawyers
engaged in transnational practice'). A lawyer admitted to practice in one jurisdiction may be subject to
disciplinary authority there regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs. The choice of law provision
makes reference to both the jurisdiction in which the relevant tribunal sits and the jurisdiction in which the
lawyer's conduct occurred. See Cyrus Benson, 'Can Professional Ethics Wait? The Need for Transparency in
International Arbitration' in (2009) 3 Disp. Resol. Int'l 78, available at www.gibsondunn.com/publications/
Documents/Benson-CanProfessional EthicsWait.pdf; Janet Walker, 'Ethics in Arbitration for Counsel and
Arbitrators' in (2009) 14 Arbitration Committee Newsletter (IBA, March), p. 10 (reporting on the IBA session on
Ethics in Arbitration sponsored on 13 October 2008). See generally, Catherine A. Rogers, 'Lawyers Without
Borders' in (2009) 30 U Pa. J Int'l L 1035.
The more traditional formulation of this principle has been expressed in the maxim nemo judex in parte sua ('no
one may judge his own case'). See e.g., Matthew Gearing, "A Judge in His Own Cause?": Actual or
Unconscious Bias of Arbitrators' in (2000) 3 Int'l Arb. L Rev. 46.
Just as 'location, location, location' comprise the three key elements in sustainable real estate value, so it has
been observed that 'arbitrator, arbitrator, arbitrator' endure as the most critical factors in the integrity of any
arbitration. In the same vein, another real estate maxim that might find application to arbitrators says that
'price is what you pay, but value is what you get'.
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No less than in other areas of the law, elaboration of standards for arbitrator
ethics implicates a tension between the transient and the permanent. 3 Conflict-ofinterest principles will remain useful only if implemented with sensitivity to new
trouble spots. Traditional ethical models serve as starting points for evaluating the
fitness of those to whom business managers, investors, and nations entrust their
treasure and their welfare. Any model, however, must be flexible enough to address
novel professional temptations. In particular, vigilance commends itself when
lawyers take on various professional roles, making arguments as advocates in one
case about propositions that remain open in other cases where they sit as
arbitrators. The constant movement in arbitrators' lives and activities requires
regular adjustment in both formulation and application of contours for acceptable
and unacceptable arbitrator behaviour. 4
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Somewhat ironically, while impartiality gains ground in arbitration, it has been questioned in some quarters
with respect to judicial decision-making, most recently by supporters ofJudge Sonia Sotomayor in connection
with her nomination to the US Supreme Court. See David Brooks (op-ed.), 'The Empathy Issue' in New fork
Times, 29 May 2009, p. A25; Ellen Goodman (op-ed.), 'What's So Bad About Empathy?' in Boston Globe, 22
May 2009, p. A15. To some extent, albeit with considerably more intelligence and moderation, the call for
empathy echoes many of the slogans in the Critical Legal Studies movement of American academia during
the 1980s. For a short history of that movement, see Mark Tushnet, 'Critical Legal Studies: A Political History'
in (1991) 100 Yak LJ 1515. For a contrasting view that emphasises the deliberative nature of judicial
decision-making, see Chris Guthrie et ai, 'Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases' in (2007) 93
Cornell LRev.l, and Michael Mustill, 'What Do Judges Do?' in (1995-1996) Juridisk Tidsknft 611 (Sweden).
Although 'due process' is used more within the United States, 'natural justice' finds favour in the British
tradition. In his famous defence of the Dartmouth College charter, Daniel Webster asked rhetorically whether
the college trustees 'lost their franchises by "due course and process of law?'". He continued that the law 'hears
before it condemns' and'renders judgment only after trial'. Trustees ofDartmouth Collegev. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518, 581 (1819). The French speak of'adversarial process' (procedure contradictoire or principe de la
contradiction), and the Germans refer to 'right to a hearing in accordance with law' (Anspruch aufrechtliches Gehrn).
In public international law, bias against foreign investors unable to vindicate rights in a host state's legal
system will give rise to claims for' [d] enial ofjustice'. & J a n Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law (2005),
p. 4.
A weighted cord used to determine verticality, the plumb line has served as a metaphor for ethical standards
since Biblical times, when the prophet Amos spoke of God setting a 'plumb line in the midst of. .. Israel' to
judge the rectitude of a people found morally warped and in need of correction. Amos 7:8.
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Notwithstanding the elusiveness of perfect objectivity, a reasonable measure of
arbitrator integrity remains both desirable and attainable. 7 Although few people
are free of predispositions in an absolute sense, some will prove relatively more
detached than others with respect to any given dispute. A relative measure of
distance from troubling connections to litigants, along with a willingness to listen
carefully to both sides of a dispute, constitutes essential elements of basic due
process.8
In a cross-border context, the prohibition on bias justifies itself by reference to
the very same goal underlying the decision to arbitrate: promoting a level playing
field. A commitment to subject future disputes to arbitration usually aims to
enhance a relative measure of adjudicatory neutrality, at least when compared
with the prospect of the other side's hometown courts. Indeed, the notion that
promises are meant to be kept depends in large measure on private arbitration for
continuing vigour. Even if speed and economy prove illusory, arbitration can still
serve to enhance the perception as well as the reality of procedural fairness, thus
promoting respect for the parties' shared ex ante expectations at the time of the
contract or investment.
In a world of stubbornly heterogeneous legal cultures, each with its own
divergent view of proper conduct, elaborating one common ethical plumb line for
international arbitration poses special challenges. 9 In contrast to national legal
communities, which tend to adopt relatively formalised paths for appointing
judges, the fragmented framework of international arbitration relies on more fluid
processes for selecting decision-makers and vetting their integrity. For instance,
direct party-nomination of arbitrators coexists with arbitrator selection by
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(c) Two Ways to Sabotage Arbitration
Seeking to bring arbitration into disrepute, an evil gremlin might contemplate two
starkly different routes. One route would tolerate appointment of pernicious
arbitrators, biased and unable to judge independently. An alternate route to
shipwreck, also reducing confidence in the integrity of the arbitral process, would
establish unrealistic ethical standards that render the arbitrator's position
precarious and susceptible to destabilisation by litigants engaged in dilatory tactics
or seeking to annul unfavourable awards. 12

There are several of these institutions, such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the
International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA),
and the International Centre for the Setdement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
A study by the Global Center for Dispute Resolution (an affiliate of the American Arbitration Association)
found that attorneys and parties to arbitrations rated a 'fair and just result' as the most important element in
arbitration, above all other considerations including cost, finality, speed and privacy. See Richard W. Naimark
and Stephanie E. Keer, 'International Private Commercial Arbitration: Expectations and Perceptions of
Attorneys and Business People' in (2002) 30 Int'lBus. L. 203; see also Richard W. Naimark and Stephanie E.
Keer, 'What D o Parties Really Want from International Commercial Arbitration?' in (2002-2003) 57 Disp.
Res. J 78 (publishing same results). Both prior to the first hearing and after the award, parties to international
commercial arbitrations were asked to rank the importance of eight variables: (i) speed; (ii) privacy; (iii)
receipt of monetary award; (iv) fair and just result; (v) cost-efficiency; (vi) finality of decision; (vii) arbitrator
expertise; and (viii) continuing relationship with opposing party. Claimants and respondents alike ranked 'fair
and just result' higher (90 per cent for respondents and 75 per cent for claimants) than any other variable.
In at least one instance, an arbitral award rendered in Zurich was challenged because the presiding
arbitrator's law firm had turned down a potential client to avoid possible conflicts. The losing party argued
that the loss of potential business caused the arbitrator to become biased. The highest court in Switzerland
(Tribunal federal or Bundesgericht) dismissed the challenge in Rhone-Poulenc Rom Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Roche
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institutional appointing authorities; 10 national court decisions on arbitrator
impartiality intersect with analogous rules and decisions of arbitral institutions;
and guidelines issued by professional associations are interpreted by scholars and
practitioners from disparate procedural traditions.
This hodgepodge of influences serves as a backdrop for both honest and
spurious challenges to arbitrators. Some objections will be advanced in good faith,
based on genuine concerns about an arbitrator's exercise of independent
judgments. In other instances, however, requests to remove arbitrators or to vacate
awards represent no more than attempts to derail proceedings or to reverse
unwanted decisions.
Cynics sometimes suggest that litigants want fairness much less than they want
victory. The two goals need not be incompatible. In many contexts they intersect.
What limited empirical research does exist seems to indicate that parties to
arbitration place 'fair and just results' high in their pantheon of virtues, regardless
of whether, in the heat of battle, they focus more on victory. *'
Common sense and general experience reinforce this conclusion. In appointing
arbitrators, it would be rare indeed for counsel to seek candidates known to be dull
or dishonest, admitting their client's case to be so weak that success can come only
through trickery or bribes. Rather, fair-mindedness and intelligence remain the
most sought after qualities in arbitrators.
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II. P R O B L E M A T I C R E L A T I O N S H I P S A N D A T T I T U D E S
(a) The Basics: Independence and Impartiality
Arbitrator conflicts of interest usually fall into one of two categories: lack of
independence and lack of impartiality. In common usage, independence refers to
the absence of improper connections, 13 while impartiality addresses matters
related to prejudgment. 14 The common assumption is that an arbitrator in
international disputes must be both impartial and independent. 15
Lack of independence derives from what might be called problematic
relationships between the arbitrator and one party or its lawyer. Often these result
Diagnostic Corp., 17 February 2000, 172 Die Praxis des Bundesgerichts (Basel) [Pra.] 4, 1999 (Switz.). The
challenge was based, inter alia, on arts. 190(2)(e) of the Swiss Conflicts of Law Code (LDIP/IPRG), which
permits award annulment for violation of 'public policy' (ordre public in both the French and the German
texts). For better or for worse, in Swiss arbitration law notions of bias and partiality are subsumed under the
broader category of public policy violations.
The taxonomy is not entirely satisfactory, however. An arbitrator might be 'independent' in the sense of not
having any financial or personal links, yet still be 'partial' to one side because of a friendship (or animosity)
with respect to one of the lawyers. The chairman of a three-member arbitral tribunal might sometimes be
referred to as 'the neutral' even though all three arbitrators, in line with increasingly common practice, would
be required to be independent.
See generally, the excellent survey by Loretta Malintoppi, 'Independence, Impartiality, and Duty of Disclosure
of Arbitrators' in Peter Muchlinski et al. (eds.), Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (2008), pp. 789,
807.
See IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (2004) General Standard 1, 2,
available at www.ibanet.org/Document/ Default.aspx? DocumentUid=E2FE5E72-EB14-4BBA-B10DD33DAFEE8918 (TBA Guidelines').
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To reduce the risk of having cases decided by either pernicious or precarious
arbitrators, those who establish and apply ethical guidelines walk a tightrope
between the rival poles of (i) keeping arbitrators free from taint, and (ii) avoiding
manoeuvres that interrupt proceedings unduly. From the command post of bland
generalities, the job of evaluating independence or impartiality may seem simple.
In light of specific challenges, however, the task becomes one of nuance and
complexity, often implicating subtle wrinkles to the comportment of otherwise
honourable and experienced individuals.
The quest for balance in ethical standards entails a spectrum of situations in
which mere perceptions of bias may be given weight equal to real bias. To promote
the litigants' trust in the arbitral process, an arbitrator might sometimes step down
just to alleviate one side's discomfort. Not always, however. In some instances it
would be wrong to permit proceedings to be disrupted by unreasonable fears,
whether real or feigned.
If arbitrators must be completely sanitised from all possible external influences
on their decisions, only the most naive or incompetent would be available.
Consequently, notions such as 'proximity' and 'intensity' will be invoked to evaluate
allegedly disqualifying links or prejudgment. As we shall see, the search for balance
in ethical standards compels a constant re-evaluation of the type of relationships
and predispositions likely to trouble international arbitration.
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Italians are all liars in these cases and will say anything to suit their book. The same thing applies
to the Portuguese. But the other side here are Norwegians and in my experience the Norwegians
generally are a truthful people. In this case I entirely accept the evidence of the master of the [the
Norwegian vessel].

In connection with the application to remove the offending arbitrator, it was
argued that a formal award not having yet been rendered, there was no evidence
that an ultimate decision against the Portuguese would in fact rest on the biased
perspective. Rejecting what might be called an argument too clever by half, the
court confirmed that justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be done.
The arbitrator was removed.
More subde examples of prejudgment might include a procedural order that
presumes contested facts on which evidence has not been heard. In other instances,
an arbitrator might have written an article or delivered a speech taking a firm
position on otherwise open questions that remain central and controversial in the
dispute.
No magic attaches to this conceptual framework. Independence and
impartiality serve merely as intellectual hooks on which to hang analysis with
respect to two basic principles expected of arbitrators. 17 No arbitrator should have
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from financial dealings (such as business transactions and investments), ties of a
sentimental quality (including friendships and family), or links of group
identification (for example, shared nationality and professional or social
affiliations). Individuals should decline appointment if they have doubts about
their ability to be impartial or independent, or if facts exist such as to raise
reasonable concerns on either score.
Even if no special relationship or financial link exists with either side, a second
category of concerns will arise if an arbitrator appears to have prejudged some
matter. An arbitrator might be independent but still be a bigot, with low opinions
about people of a particular race, nationality or religion. This second category
(often called 'actual bias') was illustrated by the English decision arising from a
maritime accident off the coast of France, between a Portuguese and a Norwegian
vessel, submitted to arbitration in London by the two respective ship-owners. 16
During hearings, counsel for one side mentioned a case involving Italians. To
which, the arbitrator responded as follows:

In re The Owners of the Steamship Catalina and The Owners of the Motor Vessel Norma [1938] 61 Lloyd's Rep. 360
(Eng.). Thanks to my friend Prof. Loukas Mistelis for correcting the misimpression that it was the Greeks,
rather than the Portuguese, who were the liars.
Much of the pioneering work in this field has been done by Catherine Rogers. See e.g., Catherine A. Rogers,
Ethics in International Arbitration (2009); Catherine A. Rogers, 'The Ethics of International Arbitrators' in
Lawrence W. Newman and Richard D. Hill (eds.), The Leading Arbitrators' Guide to International Arbitration (2008),
p. 621; Catherine A. Rogers,'The Vocation of the International Arbitrator' in (2005) Am. UInt'l LRev. 957.
For an Australian perspective on the matter, see Samuel Luttrell, Bias Challenges in International Commercial
Arbitration (2009). For a survey of analogous principles applicable to judges who sit on international tribunals,
see generally, The Burgh House Principles on the Independence of the International Judiciary (ILA, 2004),
available at www.ucl.ac.uk/ laws/cict/docs/burgh_fmal_21204.pdf
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See Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes (2004), note on neutrality, available at
www.abanet.org/dispute/commercial_disputes.pdf ('AAA/ABA Code of Ethics'). The 2004 version
establishes a presumption of neutrality unless the parties agree otherwise, in which event the non-neutral
individuals will be governed by the tenth set of principles in the Code of Ethics. Ibid. Canon X.
See generally, William W. Park, Neutrality, Predictability and Economic Cooperation in (1995) 12 J Int'lArb. 99.
Normally, arbitral duties should not be delegated. See AAA/ABA Code of Ethics, supra n. 18 at Canon V(C).
See also Note from the Secretariat of the ICC Court concerning Appointment of Administrative Secretaries
by Arbitral Tribunals in (1995) ICC Int'lCtArb. Bull. (November), pp. 77, 78, which provides that the work of
any secretary (somewhat analogous to the clerk of a US judge) 'must be strictly limited to administrative tasks'
and that the secretary 'must not influence in any manner whatsoever the decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal'.
Section 4(d) of the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest provides, inter alia, that before attempting to assist
the parties in reaching a settlement, the arbitrator should 'receive an express agreement by the parties that
acting in such a manner shall not disqualify the arbitrator from continuing to serve as arbitrator'. IBA
Guidelines, supra n. 15 at s. 4(d). The Guidelines continue, 'Such express agreement shall be considered to be
an effective waiver of any potential conflict of interest that may arise from the arbitrator's participation in
such process or from information that the arbitrator may learn in the process'. Ibid.; see generally, Gabrielle
Kaufmann-Kohler, 'When Arbitrators Facilitate Settlement: Towards a Transnational Standard' in (2009) 25
Arb. Int'l 187, adapted from Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Clayton Utz Lecture at the University of Sydney,
9 October 2007.
For example, the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Practice Guidelines No. 16 ('The Interviewing of
Prospective Arbitrators') provides in s. 13(4) that a sole arbitrator should not normally be interviewed except
by the parties jointly. Practice Guidelines, guideline 16, available at www. ciarb.org/information-andresources/practice-guidelines-and-protocols/list-of-guidelines-and- protocols.
See e.g., ICC Int'l CtArb. Bull. (2007 Special Supp.) (February 2008), a special supplement entitled 'Independence
of Arbitrators', with contributions by Louis Epstein ('Arbitrator Independence and Bias: The View of a
Corporate In-House Counsel'); Dominique Hascher (A Comparison between the Independence of State
Justice and the Independence of Arbitration'); Ahmed S. El-Kosheiri and Karim Y. Youssef ('The
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links with either side that provide an economic or emotional stake in the outcome
of the case. And no arbitrator should decide a controverted matter prior to hearing
evidence and argument.
A third notion, sometimes called 'neutrality', generally encompasses both
independence and impartiality. This term takes on a special connotation for
domestic arbitration within the United States, which traditionally distinguished
between 'neutral' and 'non-neutral' arbitrators. 18
One useful formulation of the type of the independence required of arbitrators
might be found in the notion of'relative reversibility' as between the two sides.19
Under this approach, an arbitrator would be independent as between an Israeli
seller and an Egyptian buyer if his predisposition toward one side or the other
would not change on reversal of the parties' nationalities. In that particular
context, a French or Swiss arbitrator might be characterised as more neutral than
an Israeli or an Egyptian. This does not mean that an Israeli or an Egyptian
arbitrator would lack integrity. Rather, a perception might exist that it would be
asking too much of either one to judge the dispute.
Of course, an arbitrator may deviate from duty through avenues other than
prejudgment and inappropriate relationships. The contours of integrity touch on
matters as diverse as delegation of tasks,20 participation in settlement
negotiations, 21 and inappropriate interviews with party representatives. 22
Nevertheless, independence and impartiality constitute the core of arbitrator
integrity, and continue to be emphasised at professional symposia 23 and in the
literature. 24
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(b) Can Integrity Be Waived?

Independence of International Arbitrators: An Arbitrator's Perspective'); Lord Steyn ('England: The
Independence and/or Impartiality of Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration'); Francois Terre
('Independence and Arbitrators'); Anne Marie Whitesell ('Independence in ICC Arbitration'); and Otto L.O.
de Witt Wijnen ('The IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration Three Years On').
See essays collected in a special issue on arbitrator bias in Transnational Dispute Management (July 2008), available
at www.transnational-dispute-management.com/ (subscription required).
See IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at Pt II, ss. 1-2. See also discussion infra.
Schwartzman v. Harlap, No. 08 Civ. 4990(BMC), 2009 WL 1009856 (E.D.N.Y. April 13, 2009).
The fourth book of Moses (Leviticus 23:40) mentions the fruit of the 'godly' or 'beautiful' tree, which Jewish
tradition interprets to be the esrog. The week-long festival of Succoth falls in autumn for the Northern
Hemisphere, and memorialises the booths or 'tabernacles' used during the 40 years of Hebrew wandering
from Egypt after the Exodus.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature 10 June
11958,21 UST 2517,330 UNTS 38 ('New York Convention'). This convention is also called the 1958 United
Nations Arbitration Convention.
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One intriguing question relates to the extent that either independence or
impartiality may be waived by fully informed litigants. In some circles the answer
seems to be a conditional ' y e s \ at least with respect to independence, even if not
necessarily so for impartiality. The International Bar Association Guidelines on
Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (IBA Guidelines) contain a 'Red
List' of prohibited relationships that bifurcates into waivable and non-waivable
relationships. The former include, inter alia, an arbitrator who acts for a litigant in
the case, or is a member of the same firm as counsel to one side. The latter
encompass an arbitrator's service as director in a corporation that is party to the
case or as adviser to his or her appointing party. 25
Independence thus seems to lend itself to waiver up to the point where the
litigant actually becomes judge of its own cause. At that moment the decisionmaking process may no longer bear the attributes permitting its enforcement as an
'award' under relevant statutes and treaties. Although a mother might well referee
games among her children, deciding a quarrel between her son and his schoolmate
would be a different matter. Likewise, it would be impermissible for an arbitrator
to own a majority interest in one of the parties, no matter how much he or she
might try to be fair.
A recent case tested the extent to which arbitrator integrity can be waived in an
international context. 26 A dispute arose over distribution of a Biblical citrus fruit
called the esrog (or etrog), used in connection with the Jewish Harvest festival of
Succoth. 27 An American distributor refused to pay the balance due for imported
fruit, complaining that the Israeli grower had circumvented the exclusive
distributorship by selling to third parties. The controversy was submitted to
arbitration before an Israeli clergyman who found in favour of the grower.
The award was presented for enforcement in the United States under the New
York Convention. 28 The distributor resisted confirmation, arguing that the
arbitrator was not independent, due to services rendered to the grower by
certifying the orchard's kosher status, which was essential to maintaining the fruit's
marketability.
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At least one respectable current in French legal thinking posits the existence of an independent juridical
status for arbitration (Vordrejuridique arbitral} that seems to hover somewhere above and beyond what might be
called the normal framework for national arbitration law. See Emmanuel Gaillard, Aspects philosophiques du droit
de I'arbitrage international (2008), originally published in (2007) 329 Recuil des Cours (Hague Academy of
International Law).
New York Convention, Art. V(l)(b) provides for non-recognition when the losing party was 'unable to present
his case'. The French text talks about the impossibility of a party 'de faire valoir ses moyens'. Likewise, the
Federal Arbitration Act permits vacatur in the event of'evident partiality' by the arbitrator. 9 USC s. 10(a)(2)
(2006).
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, arts.
14(1), 52(l)(d), 18 March 1965, 17 UST 1270, 575 UNTS 159 ('ICSID Convention').
Alan Scott Rau, 'On Integrity in Private Judging' in (1998) 14 Arb. Int'l 115, adapted from Alan Scott Rau,
'Integrity in Private Judging'in (1997) 38 S Tex. LRev. 485. See also Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon and Ross, Inc., 28
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The court rejected the challenge, finding that the distributor knew of the
arrangement and thus waived a right to complain. The assumption seems to have
been that the right to a fair hearing could be waived, or at the least that objections
must be raised in a timely fashion. From a practical perspective this seems
reasonable. Otherwise, a litigant might simply hope for a successful outcome,
raising the conflict only if things do not end with a happy result.
How far this result can be pushed remains open to question. The case concerned
lack of independence, not positive prejudgment. Although interrelated,
independence and impartiality are not the same thing. Prejudgment would seem to
impede the very heart of the arbitral process, which presumes a quasi-judicial
function of deciding legal claims after weighing evidence and argument. The lack
of independence may create an imperfect arbitration, but prejudgment renders the
process a sham formality, an unnecessary social cost. Although the New York
Convention contains no definition of arbitration, prejudgment seems entirely foreign
to the process whose recognition the treaty contemplates.
Nothing prevents enforcement of an arbitrator's decision simply as a matter of
contract. However, actors in cross-border commerce seek something more than
just a contractual framework for arbitration. The New York Convention and its
antecedents (the Geneva Convention and Geneva Protocol of 1927 and 1923,
respectively) grew from dissatisfaction with contract law alone as a remedy for
failure to respect arbitration commitments. The commercial community sought to
facilitate enforcement of arbitrators' decisions as awards, not simple contracts. 29
The legal matrix for such enforcement presumes a minimum level of
impartiality in the arbitrator's respect for the parties' right to be heard. 30 Likewise,
for investor-state arbitration the ICSID Convention requires arbitrators to be
persons 'who may be relied upon to exercise independent judgment' and permits
challenge of an award for 'departure from a fundamental rule of procedure'. 31
Although litigants might waive impartiality as a matter of contract, in so doing
they may well remove their dispute from the legal framework applicable to the
creature we call arbitration.
Not all agree, however, with such a balance between freedom of contract and
arbitral integrity. One of the most thoughtful scholarly commentators argues that
ethical questions should resolve themselves into issues of contract interpretation. 32
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(c) The Devil in the Detail
(i) Clear conflicts
Most analysis starts with relatively clear models on which most reasonable people
agree, and then proceeds from black and white to shades of gray. An arbitrator
who says French people exaggerate should not judge a case with a respondent
from Paris. And an arbitrator should not become romantically entangled with a
lawyer representing one side in the case. 33 Equally settled is the proposition that an
arbitrator will not be disqualified merely because once, during a mid-morning
coffee break at a professional lecture, he chatted with a lawyer appearing before
him in a case.
Nuances appear at some point between extremes. The somewhat ambiguous
notion of friendship might encompass business associates who occasionally share a
meal, as well as confidants who exchange regular calls and visits. In some cases, the
shared cup of coffee can become a deeper relationship that results in arbitrator
disqualification.
(ii) Variations on a theme
Although some behaviour patterns provide per se evidence of impropriety, other
types of conduct take on radically different ethical overtones depending on the
circumstances. For example, arbitrators concerned about committing time for
distant hearings might build into their terms of appointment provisions to cover
days reserved but ultimately not used due to the parties' decision to cancel without
adequate notice. In some instances, a retainer might be requested to cover such an
eventuality. If properly disclosed to all parties and requested prior to accepting the
time commitment, such an arrangement might not pose any problem. 34 However,

F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994), in which Judge Posner suggests that 'short of authorizing trial by battle or
ordeal, or more doubtfully, by a panel of three monkeys, parties can stipulate to whatever procedures they
want to govern the arbitration of their disputes'.
For a tale of room sharing by an arbitrator and a lawyer appearing before him in a case, see Richard B.
Schmitt, 'Suite Sharing' in Wall Street Journal, 14 February 1990, p. Al. On two different nights, a video
camera caught an arbitrator entering and leaving the hotel suite for one of the lawyers in his case. The
attorney claimed that the arbitrator initially stayed with her because she had felt ill and he was concerned for
her health. On the second night, said the attorney, the arbitrator was waiting for a lost briefcase that was not
found until late evening, by which time he no longer had a room. The concerned attorney thus offered to
share her room with him again. Ibid.
See e.g., K/S Norjarl A/S v. Hyundai Heavy Indus. Co. [1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 524 (CA) (Eng.) (holding the
arbitrators did not misconduct themselves in seeking security for remuneration with respect to 12 weeks of
hearings scheduled for two years in the future).
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Even if this perspective might prevail in certain jurisdictions, it does not necessarily
commend itself as the better view as a policy matter. One remembers words
attributed to Talleyrand to the effect that the excessive becomes meaningless: 'Tout
ce qui est excessif devient insignifiant'.
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See e.g., Lawrence F. Ebb, 'A Tale of Three Cities: Arbitrator Misconduct by Abuse of Retainer and
Commitment Fee Arrangements' in (1992) 3 Am. Rev. Int'lArb. 177, 181-90 (discussing State oflsraelv. Desert
Exploration), as reprinted in W. Michael Reisman, W. Laurence Craig,, Willliam W. Park and Jan Paulsson,
International Commercial Arbitration (1997), p. 603.
See AT&T Corp. v.Saudi Cable Co. [2000] 2 Uoyd's Rep. 127, 137 (CA) (Eng.), available at 2000 WL 571190.
See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cos. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968). Compare the competing approaches of
Justices Black (requiring disclosure of any relationship),White (calling for scrutiny only of non-trivial links)
and Fortas (focusing on actual bias).
See La SAJandPAvax SA v. Societe Tecnimont SPA, Cour d'appel Paris, le ch., sec. C, 12 February 2009, (2009)
Rev. Arb. 186, note Clay.
The award was vacated under art. 1502(2) of the French Code de procedure civile, providing for annulment
when an arbitral tribunal was not properly constituted (tribunal irregulmement compose). The International
Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration (ICC Rules) applicable to the particular case require
independence of all arbitrators.
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a retainer paid by only one party, and not revealed to the other side, might well be
seen as a bribe, and understandably so. 35
More subtle factors can also colour perceptions and evaluations on conflicts of
interest. Was a gap in the curriculum vitae intentional or inadvertent? 36 Was the
arbitrator's previous consulting work for one of the parties significant?37 Does a
former law firm affiliation create a perception of continuing links? The
appreciation of a conflict might vary depending on whether it is expressed in a
positive or a negative fashion. Is an 'independent' arbitrator the same as one who
is 'not biased' toward either side?
Often it will be important whether a lawyer serving as an arbitrator practices in
partnership with a firm whose other members represent affiliates of the litigants.
On occasion, however, an arbitrator may be tainted even without the status of
employee or partner. One Paris Court of Appeal judgment addressed a situation in
which a lawyer with the Paris office of a large multinational law firm had failed,
apparently by simple inadvertence, to disclose all links between his firm and one of
the parties. 38 Although neither a partner nor associate (but simply 'of counsel') to
the law firm, the lawyer was found to be constitutionally connected (structurellement
lie) with the Paris office to an extent requiring attribution of the firm's conflicts.39
A general standard of independence usually takes meaning only as applied to
specific cases, some of which resist facile analysis. Should an arbitrator be
disqualified if he or she sits on the board of a financial institution that manages
pension funds holding shares of affiliates of one of the parties? If so, does it matter
how large the institution, or how sizeable the ownership of interest might be in
proportion to the entire portfolio?
If it seems obvious that an arbitrator should not sit when he or she represents
one of the parties, does the same rule apply when his firm represented an affiliate
in an unconnected matter five years ago? What about one year ago? Or ten? If it
seems obvious that an arbitrator should not be having a romance with a lawyer for
one of the parties, the same conclusion will not necessarily be self-evident with
respect to a witness with whom a good friendship existed during university days. In
determining when a professional acquaintance becomes a disqualifying
relationship, the devil will be very much in the detail of how regularly the two
might dine together.
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(d) The Parties' Role in Arbitrator Selection
To promote confidence in the international arbitral process, party input into the
selection of arbitrators has long been common practice. Even limited interview of
candidates by counsel has been allowed, at least with safeguards to avoid discussion
of the merits of the case. 42 Rightly or wrongly, litigants often perceive a benefit in
direct selection of a tribunal, rather than leaving the choice entirely to an
institution. By vetting a proposed arbitrator, the party may feel more comfortable
that the case will be decided by someone who is skilled, fair, and perhaps even
smart.
Those unfamiliar with international arbitration sometimes express surprise at
the degree of party involvement in the selection process, suggesting that it may
inject a corrupting influence on the independence of arbitrators. Yet the
justification for a heightened party participation will be evident after a moment of

See generally, Ilhyung Lee, 'Practice and Predicament: the Nationality of the International Arbitrator' in (2008)
31 Fordhamlnt'lLJ 603.
The obverse might be less certain, however. The High Court of London has sustained a challenge to an
arbitrator because he was not Muslim. An arbitration clause in a joint venture between two Muslim
businessmen provided for a tribunal drawn exclusively from the Ismaili community, a branch of Shi'a Islam
led by Aga Khan. One side resisted the other's attempt to appoint a retired English judge who was not
Ismaili. The party seeking to confirm the appointment argued that to bar non-Muslims would constitute
religious discrimination in violation of English law. The court rejected that argument and upheld the
constitution of an all-Ismaili tribunal. See Nurdin Jivraj v. Sadruddin Hashward [2009] EWHC (Comm) 1364
(Eng.). This result accords with the way many courts treat proceedings before a Beth Din (court ofJewish law)
when all parties have accepted its jurisdiction. See e.g., Jfjeilerv. Deitsch, 500 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2007) (business
partnership); Meshel v. Ohev Sholom Talmud Torah, 869 A.2d 343 (D.C. 2005) (bylaws ofJewish congregation);
Avit&tr v. Avitzur, 108 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983) (prenuptial agreement). See generally, Michael C. Grossman, 'Is
This Arbitration?: Religious Tribunals, Judicial Review and Due Process' in (2007) 107 Colum. L. Rev. 169;
Ginnie Fried, 'The Collision of Church and State: Primer to Beth Din Arbitration and the New York Secular
Courts' in (2004) 31 Fordham Urb. LJ 633.
See generally, Practice Guidelines, guideline 16, supra n. 22.
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Should national origin matter? Should it matter that an arbitrator is an
American of Korean ancestry presiding in a dispute between a Korean claimant
and a Japanese respondent? 40 And what about religion? In a domestic commercial
arbitration, one would not normally expect an arbitrator being challenged for
being Muslim or Hindu. 41 Would the same calm insouciance toward religious
affiliation obtain with respect to arbitration of a border dispute between Pakistan
and India?
Likewise, the very existence of professional expertise can present an ethical
conundrum. If a scholar has expressed a firm opinion on a narrow and
controverted point on which the case hangs, she may not inspire confidence in the
party that received the rough side of the academic analysis. However, learned
professionals do (and should) write treatises sharing their knowledge. A professor of
contract law at a US law school would not normally be disqualified for having
written about 'offer and acceptance'. It would be a shame to exclude from service
those who really know something, leaving arbitration only to the ignorant.
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French magistrats pursue civil service careers following a competitive examination and study at the Ecole
Nationale de la Magistrature. See generally,}o\m Bell, 'Principles and Methods ofJudicial Selection in France'
in (1988) 61 SCalLRtv. 1757.
The perception of such institutions as too 'pro-Western' explains much of the impetus behind the United
Nations Conference on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules. Some organisations are
non-national in name only. For example, the International Centre for Dispute Resolution is based in New
York and affiliated with the American Arbitration Association.
For some institutions, such as the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration, parties
technically are permitted only to 'nominate' an arbitrator, with the actual appointment authority falling to
the ICC Court, which in essence can exercise a veto over a clearly unqualified nominee. International
Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration Rules, art. 7(4).
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mature reflection on the difference between national and international
proceedings.
In a relatively homogeneous and integrated juridical environment, the
individuals selected as judges (or at an earlier stage, the principal candidates for
judgeships) will be well known to the other members of the legal profession (as in
England and the United States), or will have been selected by nationally
administered examination, as in countries following the French model. 43 They will
likely know each other, direcdy or indirectly, through university, court
appearances, or professional associations. Shifting from selection of judges to
choice of arbitrators, within a single-country framework, a national institution may
well inspire some measure of analogous confidence as an appointing authority, as
for example the American Arbitration Association generally commands in the
United States.
By contrast, if an American company has a dispute with the Chinese
government, the two sides may not be equally comfortable with any single
appointing authority framework. The party from the United States may like the
American Arbitration Association, while the Chinese may favour the China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC). Even
venerable institutions of long standing, such as the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) or the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), may
be suspect to some observers as dominated by interests and traditions of
industrialised nations. 44
In such circumstances, the task of constructing a mutually acceptable arbitral
tribunal would normally be facilitated by allowing each side to appoint an
arbitrator, and having the two party-nominated arbitrators choose the third
member of the tribunal. Such party participation democratises the process, serving
to foster trust that at least one person on the tribunal (the party's nominee) will
monitor the procedural integrity of the arbitration. 45
Party participation in the constitution of a tribunal means that each side will
want to be sure that its nominee (and the presiding arbitrator if possible) will be
free of doctrinal predispositions that would adversely affect its case. A company
whose assets have just been expropriated will not be keen on a tribunal dominated
by a professor who has written a book supporting uncompensated nationalisation.
Likewise, the host state will not want someone who has taken the position that
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national welfare must take a back seat to profit maximisation for the foreign
investor.
In practice, the process of evaluating ideological conflicts may shift from
avoiding the 'wrong' arbitrator to jockeying for the 'best' arbitrator. Even if a
litigant knows that an arbitrator cannot be in its pocket, the litigant may,
understandably, still hope to appoint someone who falls into its corner
doctrinally.46 Thus, rejection of the left-wing professor as tribunal chairman may
become an effort to nominate a strong capitalist, with traditional views on 'prompt,
adequate and effective' compensation. 47 The risk in such excessive wrangling, of
course, is that the selection process becomes unworkable, a bit like what happens
when a schoolchild tries to sharpen a pencil to an excessively fine point.
The game can become even more complex with respect to procedural matters.
For instance, a party hoping to avoid extensive document production may prefer a
French professor over an American litigator, given that US style 'discovery'
(including requests to produce extensive documentation that may be adverse to
one's own arguments) has traditionally been foreign to the Continental legal
system.48
Party input into the arbitrator selection process need not impinge on arbitrator
integrity. Current arbitration rules and canons of ethics point to a consensus that
now presumes independence and impartiality as the norm for all arbitrators (not
just the chair) on a three-member tribunal, notwithstanding an assumption that
each side will nominate an arbitrator.
This does not mean, however, that tension never exists between the value of
independence and the parties' desire for an advocate on the tribunal. In the
United States, it was the case until recendy that party-appointed arbitrators were
presumed not to be neutral. 49 Moreover, scepticism about the merits of neutrality
for party-appointed arbitrators has made a revival in some scholarly writing, 50 as
well as in the emerging protocols for arbitration pursuant to income tax treaties. 51

The late Sir Michael Kerr, a leading light of the English bar during the latter half of the twentieth century,
once playfully recounted to the author advice he had received from a senior colleague who learned of his
nomination as a party-appointed arbitrator. 'My boy', said the older man, 'steer a middle course between too
much and too litde independence'.
The doctrine of 'prompt, adequate, and effective' compensation was first introduced by Secretary of State
Cordell Hull in his letter to the Ambassador of Mexico requesting compensation for expropriation of
property of American nationals. For a reprint of the letter, see Green Haywood Hackworth, Digest of
International Law (1942), vol. 3, p. 659.
For a European comparison of English and Swiss document production, see Arielle Elan Visson, Droit a la
production de pieces et discovery: Droit federal, drois cantonaux de Vaud, Geneve, Zurich et droit anglais (1997) (Switz.).
See AAA/ABA Code of Ethics, supra n. 8, preamble; see also, Stephen G. Yusem, 'Comparing the Original with
the Revised American Bar Association-American Arbitration Association Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in
Commercial Disputes' in Metropolitan Corp. Corns. (July 2004), pp. 38, 38-39, 64 ('the judiciary has generally
supported the concept of non-neutrality both before and after the adoption of the original Code. The
original Code assumed that the business community desired and expected non-neutrality; however, the
modern rules of the major institutional ADR providers require neutrality for party-appointed arbitrators'
(citations omitted)).
See Tony Cole, Authority and Contemporary International Arbitration , 70 Louisiana Law Rev. 801 (2010), arguing
that party-appointed arbitrators should 'see themselves as the party's representative on the panel'. Prof. Cole
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It has seemed to me that the great obstacle to the universal adoption of arbitration is not the
unwillingness of civilized nations to submit their disputes to the decision of an impartial tribunal;
it is rather an apprehension that the tribunal selected will not be impartial. 52

Similar sentiments were included the following month in his instructions to the
American delegates to the Second Hague Conference that revised the status for the
Permanent Court of Arbitration. 53
III. N E W F R O N T I E R S
(a) Issue Conflict and Role Confusion
Among the new categories for possible conflicts that continue to suggest
themselves, increasing concern has been expressed with respect to 'issue conflict'
and its sibling, 'role confusion'. Each represents a special form of prejudgment.
On occasion, an arbitrator must address, in the context of an arbitration, the
very same issue presented to him or his law firm as advocate in another case, or to
himself as scholar in academic writings. It is not difficult to see why such situations
might compromise the integrity of the arbitral process. The arbitrator might be
tempted, even subconsciously, to add a sentence to an award that could later be

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/arbitration/article-abstract/27/3/473/250636 by Boston University user on 05 December 2019

Ambivalence about arbitrator independence and impartiality seems to have
been particularly marked in public international arbitration. More than a century
ago, the US Secretary of State lamented that arbitrators in state-to-state disputes
tended to see themselves as diplomats rather than as judicial decision-makers
looking to the law and the facts. In a speech given in April 1907, Secretary of State
Elihu Root opined as follows:

suggests that such partisan behaviour will enhance understanding of the nominating party's views, but will
not prevent the arbitrator from being independent and impartial. Ibid.
Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, Art. 25(5) (OECD, 2008). Still in its infancy, tax treaty
arbitration has not yet evolved into a system in which all arbitrators are genuinely independent. Although the
new treaties contain a general prohibition on presiding arbitrators of the same nationality of either country,
governments have not been willing to provide specific guidelines for independence of the arbitrators
appointed by the two disputing nations, each of which may appoint government officials. See recent protocols
for tax treaty arbitration concluded by the United States with Belgium, Canada and Germany. IRS.gov,
Mandatory Tax Treaty Arbitration, available at www. irs.gov/businesses/international/article/
0„id=20T209,00.html.
Robert Erskine Ely (ed.), Proceedings of the National Arbitration and Peace Congress (1907), p. 43. Secretary of State
Root then quotes Lord Salisbury and goes on to say: 'The essential fact which supports that feeling, is that
arbitrators too often act diplomatically rather than judicially; they consider themselves as belonging to
diplomacy rather than to jurisprudence; they measure their responsibility and their duty by the traditions, the
sentiments and the sense of honorable obligation which have grown up in the centuries of diplomatic
intercourse, rather than by the traditions, the sentiments and the sense of honorable obligation which
characterize the judicial departments of civilized nations'. Ibid..p. 44.
Comments by Elihu Root, S. Doc. No. 444 10-11, 1128, 1135 (60th Sess. 1907), reprinted in John Hay and
Elihu Root, Instructions to the American Delegates to the Hague Conferences, 1899 and 1907 (World Peace Foundation
Pamphlet Series, 1913), vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 20, 22-23. The Permanent Court of Arbitration had been
established eight years earlier, in 1899, by the First Hague Peace Conference. See also Elihu Root, Instructions
to the American Delegates to the Hague Conference, 1907, in James Brown Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899
and 1907 (1909), vol. 2, pp. 181, 191.
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cited in another case. Such an arriere pensee might lead to disparaging or approving
some legal authority or argument regularly presented in similar disputes, 54 and
thus intended to persuade in a different matter where the arbitrator's firm acts as
counsel.
The flip-side of the coin might also present itself, with an arbitrator influenced
by his or her position while acting as counsel in another case. This difficulty was
encountered in a treaty-based investment proceeding heard in the Netherlands,
where a Dutch court gave an individual 10 days to decide whether to resign as
arbitrator or as counsel. 55 The judicial reasoning rested on the specific facts of the
case at bar, and created no automatic presumption of bias simply because the same
individual might serve as arbitrator in one case and counsel in another.
Other wrinkles on this theme come from the world of sports. In one recent case,
the cyclist Floyd Landis challenged an arbitral award upholding a doping
disqualification for use of synthetic testosterone in the 2006 Tour de France. The
Lausanne-based Court of Arbitration for Sport/Tribunal Arbitral du Sport (CAS/
TAS) had convened the arbitral tribunal to review a ban imposed by the US
Anti-Doping Agency.56
In September 2008, Landis moved to challenge the decision in a US federal
court in California, contending that the arbitral tribunal had been tainted by
conflicts of interest. 57 The gist of the argument seems to be that the arbitrators
came from a limited pool that often filled rotating functions between arbitrator
and advocate, allegedly prone to rule favourably for each other. 58

For example, investor-state cases routinely implicate the shareholders' right to bring derivative claims on
behalf of corporations in which they own stock. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain,
Second Phase) [1970] ICJ 3 (5 February), available at 1970 WL 1 (IGJ).
See A. Marriott, 'The Arbitrator is Counsel' in Transnat'l Disp. Mgmt (December 2006), available at
www.transnational-dispute-management.com/ (subscription required). The well-known French jurist
Emmanuel Gaillard, sitting as arbitrator in a case pitting Telekom Malaysia against Ghana, had been
advising an Italian construction consortium (RFCC) that sought to annul an earlier ICSID award rejecting
claims against Morocco. On 18 October 2004, the Hague District Court reasoned that Emmanuel Gaillard,
in his role as counsel in RFCC/Morocco, would advocate the invalidity of that award, on which Ghana relied
for its defence in the Telekom Malaysia matter. As arbitrator, Gaillard would be required to remain openminded towards the validity of the earlier award. Gaillard chose to resign as counsel rather than as arbitrator.
Ibid.
The CAS/TAS panel was comprised of a multinational tribunal including David Williams, Jan Paulsson and
David Rivkin. Landis v. US Anti-Doping Agency, CAS 2007/A/1394 (Ct Arb. Sport 2008), available at www.tascas.org/d2wffles/document/1418/5048/0/Award%20Final%20Landis%20(2008.06.30).pdf.
Mr Landis filed a Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award in the US District Court for the Central District of
California. The case was ultimately settled with prejudice on 4 December 2008. Landis moved to vacate on
the basis of the Federal Arbitration Act, s. 10(a)(2) (evidential partiality or corruption) and New York
Convention, Art. V(l)(a) (invalid arbitration agreement), (d) (improper composition of the tribunal) and (2)(b)
(violation of public policy). Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award and Demand for Jury Trial, Landis v. US
Anti-Doping Agency, No. CV 08-06330 (CD. Cal. 25 September 2008).
The motion alleges, 'these arbitrators constantly find themselves changing hats, arbitrator one day, litigant
the next'. Ibid. 27. As illustration, the motion recites that David Rivkin presided over a CAS/TAS panel
considering an action against Austrian skiers in which Mr Paulsson represented the IOC, with the result
(according to the motion) that the arbitrator appointed by the Anti-Doping Agency (David Rivkin) was sitting
in judgment of the arbitrator appointed by Mr Landis (Jan Paulsson). Ibid. 24. The motion also recites that
David Rivkin represented an affiliate of Occidental Petroleum in an arbitration in which the same David
Williams served as arbitrator. Ibid. 27.
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(b) Institutional Bias and Professional Affiliation
To some extent, concerns over issue conflict and role confusion intersect with what
is sometimes called 'institutional bias'. A particular arbitral institution might be
perceived as tending to appoint arbitrators likely to favour one category of litigants
over others. For example, in a consumer debt action, arbitrators with long
affiliations to banks and lending institutions might not inspire confidence in
borrowers. Or, in a dispute over mismanagement of an investment account, an
arbitrator who worked for a large financial institution might create an
understandable apprehension of being predisposed to favour the brokerage
house. 63
A somewhat related charge is made that arbitrators may have incentives to
decide in favour of claimants in order to increase their prospects of reappointment.
Elmar Gundelv. Federation intemationak d'eguitation, Recueil Officiel Tribunal federal Suisse, 15 March 1993, 119
Recueil Officiel des Arrets du Tribunal federal [ATF] II 271 (Switz.), extract reprinted in (1986-1998)
Recueil des sentences du TAS Digest of CAS Awards 561 (Matthieu Reeb (ed.), 1998); see Jan Paulsson, 'The
Swiss Federal Tribunal Recognises the Finality of Arbitral Awards relating to Sports Disciplinary Sanctions
Rendered by the IOC's Court of Arbitration for Sports' in Int'lArb. Rep. (October 1993), p. 12.
One scholar described this decision as 'oui, mais' ('yes, but'). Antonio Rigozzi, L'arbitrage international en matiere
de sport s. 523 (2005), p. 274.
The entity is called the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS) in English and Conseil
international pour l'arbitrage en matiere de sport (CIAS) in French. For the operation of the ICAS/CIAS,
see generally, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitration at the Olympics (2001).
See e.g., Lazutina and Danilova v. IOC, FIS and CAS, Tribunal federal Suisse, 27 May 2003, 129 ATF III 445
(Switz.) (concerning members of the Russian women's ski team). See also, commentary in Rigozzi, supra n. 60
atss. 537-551, pp. 279-287.
Ironically, the rise of consumer and employment arbitration within the United States derives in some
measure from a mirror image concern over civil juries being predisposed toward the 'little guy' as represented
by the customer or the worker. For expressions of concern from someone who questions the tradition of
'mandatory' arbitration in the United States, see]eaxi R. Sternlight, 'Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking
the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration' in (1996) 74 Wash. ULQ_ 637, and Jean R.
Sternlight, 'In Defense of Mandatory Binding Arbitration (If Imposed on the Company)' in (2007) 8 JVev.
LJ 82.
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The independence of the CAS/TAS itself has not always been free from doubt.
In its early days, the CAS/TAS was challenged following a 1992 incident
implicating a German equestrian whose horse had ingested a prohibited
substance. A challenge to the ban was brought before Switzerland's highest court,
the Tribunal federal in Lausanne, which was asked to determine whether the
decision was in fact an arbitral award in the sense of the Swiss federal and cantonal
statutory legal framework for arbitration. 59 Although not denying the validity of
the decision in the instant case, the Tribunal federal drew attention to the
numerous then-existing links between the CAS/TAS and the International
Olympic Committee (IOC), which could cause apprehension that the
independence of the CAS/TAS would be weakened in the event the I O C stood
before it as a party to proceedings. 60
In response to the hesitation expressed in this decision, a new supervisory body
was created to insulate the CAS/TAS from the influence of the IOC. 6 1 This new
structure seems to have passed muster, at least in the eyes of the Tribunal federal.62
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Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (2007), pp. 152—153. Van Harten then goes on to
state his view that arbitrators do not satisfy the requisite standard of 'independence'. Ibid.
One study found evidence that in federal civil actions in the United States, foreigners actually fare better than
domestic parties. The explanation for this counter-intuitive finding may well lie in the fear of litigation bias
that causes foreigners to continue to final judgment only if they have particularly strong cases. See Kevin
Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg, 'Xenophilia in American Courts' in (1996) 109 Haw. L Rev. 1120.
In response to a lawsuit brought by the Minnesota Attorney General, at least one provider of arbitration
services recentiy decided not to supervise consumer arbitration. See Minnesota Attorney General, Press
Release, 'National arbitration forum barred from credit card and consumer arbitrations under agreement
with Attorney General Swanson', 20 July 2009, available at www.ag.state.mn.us/Consumer/PressRelease/
090720National ArbitrationAgremnt.asp. The complaint asserted that the arbitral institution had
impermissible links with debt collection services. Ibid.
In the United States, many of these cases fall to be decided under the auspices of the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a self-regulatory body that in 2007 consolidated the dispute resolution for
both the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange. FINRA
(NASD) Rules, rule 12402 provides in pertinent part: 'If the panel consists of one arbitrator, the arbitrator
will be a public arbitrator selected from the public chairperson roster, unless the parties agree in writing
otherwise. If the panel consists of three arbitrators, one will be a non-public arbitrator and two will be public
arbitrators, one of whom will be selected from the public chairperson roster, unless the parties agree in
writing otherwise'. FINRA Rules (2008), rule 12402, available at http://finra. complinet.com/finra/ (search
for rule number in search box). On 9June 2008, FINRA amended the definition of a 'public' arbitrator under
NASD Rules, rules 12100(u) and 13100(u), as set forth in the Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer
Disputes and the Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes. The amendment adds an annual
revenue limitation to the definition of'public' arbitrator in order to exclude from that category of individuals
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For example, one author suggests that 'as merchants of adjudicative services,
arbitrators have a financial stake in furthering [arbitration's] appeal to claimants',
which results in an 'apprehension of bias in favour of allowing claims and awarding
damages against governments'. 64
Of course, individuals who supplement their incomes as arbitrators are not
immune from temptations to greed and bias to which humanity has always been
heir. Each arbitrator should be conscious of the risk that he or she may fall prey to
astigmatic perspectives. The beginning of wisdom often lies in a healthy fear of
latent bias.
Nevertheless, no evidence supports the proposition that the arbitral system as it
now exists provides incentives to produce inaccurate decisions that favour either
claimants or respondents, or even that such incentives actually exist. Common
sense tells us that the big losers would be none other than professional arbitrators
themselves if the process did not inspire general confidence. Although concern
may be justified against certain types of arbitration, broad theories of 'arbitrator
incentives' remain difficult to support in logic or in practice, particularly for
cross-border transactions where the principal motivation to arbitrate lies in
apprehension about potential antiforeign prejudice in national courts. 65
Where necessary, dispute resolution systems can implement mechanisms to
promote the balanced composition of a tribunal. 66 For example, US securities
arbitration has understandably been concerned that the majority of a threemember tribunal should not be drawn from the ranks of lawyers who make their
living representing financial advisers. Consequendy, it has long been the practice
to identify 'public' as opposed to 'industry' arbitrators, and to make sure that the
latter do not predominate in any arbitral tribunal. 67 Analogous issues arise in
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employment arbitration, although the ways to assuage the concern are not yet that
clearly identified.68

Another critique of arbitration that dovetails into those mentioned above arises
with respect to so-called 'repeat players' who might be appointed several times by
the same party or law firm. Although some professional guidelines address the
matter, 69 greater clarity might well be in order. 70
The notion of'repeat player' has a somewhat chameleon-like character that may
lead to confusion. One concern relates to individuals who change functions in the
arbitral process, serving one day as advocate and another as arbitrator, thus
arguably sitting in judgment of each other's clients.71 Another relates to
individuals appointed on several occasions by the same company or industry
group. For example, in disputes between insurance companies and policyholders,
a barrister with a long history of acting on behalf of insurers might regularly be
named by insurers. These special situations remain quite distinct from the
understandable practice by which experienced individuals serve regularly in
commercial and investment disputes, sometimes nominated by claimant,
sometimes by respondent, and sometimes as chair.
Much can be said on behalf of the 'professional arbitrator' who serves
repeatedly, albeit in different types of cases. There may be some truth to the
oft-repeated assertion that arbitrators want to see cases decided in favour of the
parties which appointed them.
Usually, however, an even stronger incentive exists to safeguard professional
status, particularly with peers. Individuals who serve as arbitrators care deeply
about the respect of their colleagues, for reasons both personal and professional.
Doing a good job builds a positive reputation. Few enticements to good behaviour

with a direct or indirect connection to the securities industry. For example, lawyers or accountants seeking to
preside over FINRA arbitration disputes may not derive 10 per cent or more of their annual revenue from
financial institutions, or devote 20 per cent or more of their work to clients who are brokers or dealers. Ibid.
rules 12100(u), 13100(u).
See e.g., Cole v. Bums International Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997), in which ChiefJudge Harry
Edwards understandably held that an employee alleging discrimination cannot be subject to a defacto bar in
the vindication of statutory rights by virtue of inability to pay the arbitrator's fee. However, the employer's
payment of arbitrators' fees may itself raise other concerns. Mindful of the proverb that 'he who pays the
piper calls the tune', some observers wonder whether an arbitral process does not become distorted if one
industry group covers all of the costs. See also, the discussion of arbitrator neutrality in Armendariz v. Foundation
Health Psychare Services, 6 P.3d 669, 693 (Cal. 2000), another case concerning arbitration with respect to
contracts of employment.
The IBA Guidelines include the 'Orange List' of situations that may, depending on the facts of the case, give
rise to 'justifiable doubts' about an arbitrator's independence or impartiality. IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at
Pt II, s. 3.13. That provision describes an arbitrator who 'has within the past three years been appointed as
arbitrator on two or more occasions by one of the parties or an affiliate of one of the parties'. Ibid.
See generally, Fatima-Zahra Slaoui, 'The Rising Issue of "Repeat Arbitrators": A Call for Clarification' in
(2009) 25 Arb. Int'l 103.
See discussion supra of Floyd Landis v. US Anti-Doping.
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are stronger for those who sit regularly as arbitrators than a colleague's
appreciation of one's ability and integrity.72

Among the new frontiers being addressed by judicial decisions, few are more
intellectually challenging than the matter of an arbitrator's duty to investigate. It
has long been common coin of conflicts analysis that arbitrators must disclose
significant relationships that might call into question their independence. What
happens, however, when the arbitrator knows of no relevant relationships? Must
he or she go one step further and investigate possible conflicts? Must arbitrators
actively look for trouble?
The answer, perhaps unsatisfying to those who seek hard and fast rules, must be
'sometimes'. In a recent US case, an appellate court stopped short of imposing a
general duty to investigate, limiting its holding to situations in which the arbitrator
had reason to believe that some conflict might exist.73 The case confirmed vacatur
of a commercial award for 'evident partiality' (the relevant standard under the
Federal Arbitration Act) because the challenged arbitrator had failed to investigate
possible business transactions that might have affected his independence. 74
The facts of the case merit close scrutiny. A dispute between a Turkish company
and an American corporation led to arbitration in which the presiding arbitrator
learned of a potential conflict that was disclosed by email, with no objection by
either side. 75 After the arbitral tribunal determined liability in favour of the
American party, the proceedings continued into the damages phase. It was then
discovered that the challenged arbitrator's company had been involved in a
relatively small transaction (approximately US$275,000) with the entity that
acquired the American party. On the arbitrator's refusal to recuse himself, the
Turkish side brought an action to vacate the award on liability. The tribunal
chairman was president and C E O of what the reviewing court described as 'a
multi-billion dollar company with 50 offices in 30 countries'. 76 An affiliate of that
group apparently had a relatively small business transaction with a company
related to the American side. The chairman had earlier informed the parties of the
negotiations with that entity, but did not reveal that at a later time a contract had
been actually concluded. The court was not impressed by the arbitrator's
explanation that a 'Chinese Wall' had been erected between himself and the
potential conflict.77

72

73
74
75
76
77

On the general comportment of who might be sometimes called elite arbitrators, see Jan Paulsson, 'Ethics,
Elitism, Eligibility' in (1997) J Int'lArb. (December) 13. On the profiles of those chosen to serve as arbitrators
in international disputes, see Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial
Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order (1996).
See Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, AS, 492 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2007).
Ibid. 136, 139.
Ibid. 134-135.
Ibid. 135.
Ibid. 138-139.
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IV. C H A L L E N G E S I N I N V E S T O R - S T A T E A R B I T R A T I O N
(a) The Paradigm Shift
Students of history remember that claims related to mistreatment of a foreign
investor traditionally were subject either to the home court jurisdiction of the
expropriating country or to the 'gunboat diplomacy' of the investor state's political
and military influence.79 In some instances, arbitration triggered by diplomatic
pressure led to significant and controversial debates on legal theories about state
responsibility.80
In its early days, investor-state arbitration was largely a matter of contract, 81
with concession agreements serving as the foundation for arbitrators' power to
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The appellate decision noted that the lower court had cited both the American
Arbitration Association/American Bar Association Code of Ethics for Arbitrators
in Commercial Disputes (AAA/ABA Code of Ethics) and the IBA Guidelines. 78 To
the thoughtful observer, this provides an illustration of the trend towards crosspollination of ethical standards in international arbitration, with national courts
looking to professional guidelines just as arbitral institutions look to judicial
decisions.
Analogies are not perfect, of course, which is why they are simply analogies.
Judges might look to professional guidelines as a way to measure arbitrators with
their own ruler. And arbitral institutions might look to judicially created rules as
benchmarks that will be applied by reviewing courts. In either instance, however,
the result will be a convergence of standards.

Ibid. 136.
Although the legal use of force is now more circumscribed as a tool of foreign policy, see UN Charter, Art. 51,
the reality of military influence on international economic relations has not disappeared.
For example, the Tinoco case (named for General Federico Tinoco, a Costa Rican dictator who ruled between
1917 and 1919 after overthrowing that country's legitimate government) led to the elaboration of the 'odious
debt' doctrine, which was revived in the context of Iraqi commitments contracted during the regime of
Saddam Hussein. An award by William Howard Taft (who served as both President of the United States and
ChiefJustice of the US Supreme Court) upheld state succession with respect to governmental commitments
(loans to the Royal Bank of Canada) but suggested that illegitimate obligations of an illegitimate government
may nevertheless fail to bind following the downfall of the illegitimate ruler. Tinoco (Great Britain v. Costa Rica)
(1923) 1 R Int'l Arb. Awards 369, reprinted in \8Am.JInflL
147 (1924); see also, Lee C. Buchheit etal, 'The
Dilemma of Odious Debts' in (2007) 56 Duke LJ 1201, 1261 (suggesting that as a putative doctrine of
international law, had it flown at all, 'odious debts' would have flown very low, 'far beneath the level of
near-universal consensus required to make it a binding norm of international law'); Tai-Heng Cheng,
'Renegotiating the Odious Debt Doctrine' in (2007) 70 Law and Contemp. Probs. 7; David C. Gray, 'Devilry,
Complicity, and Greed: Transitional Justice and Odious Debt' in (2007) 70 Law and Contemp. Probs. 137;
Bradley N. Lewis, 'Restructuring the Odious Debt Exception' in (2007) 25 BU Int'l LJ 297; Odette Lienau,
'Who is the "Sovereign" in Sovereign Debt?' in (2008) 33 Yale J Int'l L 63. The doctrine of odious debts [dettes
odimses) was formalised in 1927 by a former minister of Tsarist Russia then teaching law in Paris. See
Alexander N. Sack, Les effets des transformations des Etats sur leurs dettespubliques et autres obligationsfinanciires (1927)
(Fr.).
Not all investment arbitration was contractual, however. In 1794, the so-called Jay Treaty (named for its
American negotiator John Jay) gave British creditors the right to arbitrate claims of alleged despoliation by
American citizens and residents. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, United States—United
Kingdom, 19November 1794,8Stat. 116. Under Art. 6, damages for British creditors were to be determined
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(b) Critiques ofArbitrator Integrity in Investor—State Cases
Investor-state arbitration has been a fertile ground for criticism related to
arbitrator integrity. Some authors have written of'the businessman's court' with
the implication that arbitrators tend to favour claimant-investors in order to
increase prospects of reappointment. 86 A large part of the critique aims at the
current 'party-selection' system, suggesting that arbitrators' desire for business
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hear investor claims for dejure or de facto expropriation. 82 During the past several
decades, however, bilateral and multilateral treaties have given foreign investors an
opportunity to arbitrate disputes even in the absence of any direct concession with
the host state. 83
The paradigm shift from contract to treaty, as the foundation for redress for
expropriation and discrimination, means that arbitrator integrity has become even
more vital to host state acceptance of investor claims that affect vital national
interests such as the environment, taxation and administration ofjustice. Although
consent remains the foundation of arbitral jurisdiction, government acceptance
takes a blanket form through free trade and investment agreements, or even an
investment statute.
A treaty-based standing offer to arbitrate gives foreign investors a direct right of
action against the host state, exercisable as the occasion arises, 84 subject always to
the conditions provided in the treaty or statute itself.85 In some instances, there
may also be an opportunity for government-to-government arbitration following
reimbursement to investors under political risk insurance.

by five commissioners, two appointed by the British and two by the United States. The fifth was to be chosen
unanimously by the others, in default of which selection would be by lot from between candidates proposed
by each side. See generally, Barton Legum, 'Federalism, NAFTA Chapter Eleven and thejay Treaty of 1794'
in (2001) 18 NewsfromICSID 11.
Often investor—state arbitration would take place pursuant to an investment concession between host country
and foreign investor. See e.g., Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 1175
(D.D.C. 1980), vacated, 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (unpublished table decision); Texaco Overseas Petrol.
Co./Cal. Asiatic Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 ILR 389 (Int'l Arb. Trib. 1978). Such investment
arbitration pursuant to concessions is different, of course, from so-called mixed commissions of the colonial
era.
See generally, Campbell McLachlan et al, International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles (2007).
Jan Paulsson has suggested the catchphrase 'arbitration without privity'. Jan Paulsson, 'Arbitration Without
Privity'in (1995) 10 ICSID Rev.—Foreign Investment LJ 232. See generally, Alain Prujiner,'L' arbitrage unilateral:
Un coucou dans le nid de l'arbitrage conventionel?' in (2005) Revue de L'Arbitrage 63.
In one recently decided ICSID case, the tribunal rightly reminded us of the need for caution with respect to
notions such as 'arbitration without privity'. Wintershall Aktimgesellschafl v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/
04/14 (2008) (Award). Fali S. Nariman presided, with Dr Santiago Torres Bernardez and Prof. Piero
Bernardini as co-arbitrators. Finding that the facts of that case did not permit the investor to invoke a 'most
favoured nation' clause (allowing an investor invoking one treaty to benefit from more favourable provisions
of another), the tribunal stressed that consent in writing remains the cornerstone of ICSID arbitration. Ibid.
para. 160. The treaty's standing offer to arbitrate must be accepted on a case-by-case basis. Lack of privity
at the beginning does not dispense with the requirement to perfect the agreement to arbitrate. Perfection
occurs when a particular investor accepts that standing offer by filing a claim, and at that time must comply
with the requirements of the treaty.
See e.g., Van Harten, supra n. 4 at pp. 175-184 (advocating a public law model with tenured judges for
investor-state dispute resolution).
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(i) Systemic bias in favour of investors
One common argument posits that systemic 'incentives' push arbitrators to decide
for investors. The argument seems to run as follows: arbitrators seek to promote
growth of investor-state proceedings in order to get future appointments; efforts to
promote arbitration translate into decisions that favour claimant-investors,
particularly when the appointing authority is ICSID, a World Bank affiliate.88 For
reasons discussed below, neither evidence nor logic supports the existence of such
incentives or their operation in practice.
As a preliminary matter, inducements to pro-investor bias remain counterintuitive. Reputations tarnished by deviation from duty do not bring
reappointment, at least when both host state and investor have a role in the
process. Assuming rational arbitrators seek to enhance income, biased decisionmaking would be an odd way to do so, given that awards would be subject to
review by either national courts (for lack of due process or violation of public
policy) or before an ad hoc committee convened in connection with an ICSID
proceeding. 89 Thus, if arbitrator incentives operate at all in large international
cases, they work to promote accuracy and honesty.
Although teenage boys may hope to attract adolescent girls by showing
themselves dangerous and daring, no similar rule works for judges or arbitrators.
Rumours of prejudice and partiality do little to enhance the credibility of
professional decision-makers, who normally benefit from reputations for reliability
and accuracy. Bad arbitrators exist, but their lack of integrity does them no
favours.
Arbitral institutions will also want to obtain a reputation for even-handedness.
In a world where treaties and contracts are freely negotiated, and multiple
See Louis T. Wells and Rafiq Ahmed, Making Foreign Investment Safe (2007), pp. 283-298. The authors criticise
investor-state arbitration for, inter alia, what they see as its rigidity and lack of sensitivity to changed
circumstances and public policy, as well as the effect of moral hazard in the form of arbitration awards that
discourage investor analysis of the stability of their contracts. They then suggest reforms including amiable
composition (disregard of law and contract in favour of what is 'fair and just'), more transparency in
arbitration, a common law that relies on precedent, and an appeals body to review awards. Ibid. p. 294. They
then suggest that serious reforms will be resisted by 'the small group of lawyers who now dominate investment
arbitration' in part because they resist 'making decisions based on criteria beyond the language of a contract'
and fear smaller awards as 'a threat to their income'. Ibid. p. 298. Some of the conclusions will startle the
thoughtful observer, particularly the suggestion that 'predictability of outcome' will follow the practice of
looking 'beyond the language of a contract' and greater recourse to amiable composition.
See Van Harten, supra n. 64 at pp. 152-153, 167-175.
ICSID Convention, Art. 52 provides for award annulment when there was, inter alia, 'corruption on the part
of a member of the Tribunal' or 'a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure'. ICSID
Convention, Art. 52(c). Challenge to an arbitrator will be allowed as to individuals who do not meet the
standards for Art. 14, which requires that an arbitrator 'may be relied upon to exercise independent
judgment'. Ibid. Art. 14.
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leads to a systemic bias in favour of investors. Such pessimistic appraisals of
arbitrators usually find themselves linked to a more diffusely negative commentary
on investor—state relations, asserting a perceived malaise with respect to the
fairness of arbitration itself.87 Each of these two concerns will be addressed below.
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See Van Harten, supra n. 64 at pp. 175-184. Although the work of Prof. Van Harten criticises ICSID as an
appointing authority, it does not seem to suggest any realistic replacement.
See generally, 'Behind Closed Doors' in The Economist, 25 April 2009, p. 63 (reporting on the 'struggle' of an
Indian lawyer named Ashok Sancheti who wished to receive publicity for his claim against the United
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institutions compete for arbitration business, it would be self-destructive if any
organisation gained a reputation for systematically turning out awards on behalf of
either claimant or respondent. The disfavoured side would simply insist on using
another forum.
As a secondary matter, one might readily admit that a system of tenured
international judges should be explored as a theoretically better system, as
suggested in the 'public law' model advocated by Professor Van Harten. 90 The
difficulty, however, lies in finding a commercial appointing authority that would
command worldwide confidence. The most realistic baseline against which to
measure the present system is not a 'World Arbitrators Corps' appointed by a
single universally admired institution, but rather a diffuse set of national courts
staffed by judges perceived as even more partial (toward their appointing
governments) than arbitrators constituted by a joint decision of the parties.
A third and even more compelling reason exists to doubt the plausibility of a
theory hypothesising pro-investor incentives. Without host state participation in
bilateral (or multilateral) investment treaties (BITs) and free trade agreements
(FTAs), investment arbitration would have little future. Just as it takes two to tango,
so it takes two countries to conclude a treaty. Investor—state arbitration succeeds
only if the process appears fair to host-state as well as investor interests. Host states
appoint as many arbitrators as investors, and a presiding arbitrator must be
acceptable to both sides.
No 'Global Arbitral Authority' today commands general acceptance in the eyes
of any sizeable number of economic players. In an international context, party
input into the arbitrator selection process remains a condition for the litigants to
feel comfortable with the legitimacy of the tribunal, and perhaps for acceptance of
the treaty commitments in the first place.
The present baseline against which to evaluate alleged arbitrator bias remains
decision-making by judges beholden to national governments. It seems unrealistic
to expect litigants to relinquish their traditional role in selecting arbitrators without
a realistic alternative. Whilst ideals can be worth pursuing even if not fully
realisable, the best would become the enemy of the good if pursuit of theoretical
neutrality led to dismantling or dismissing the current system, which for all its
faults suffers far less bias than its alternatives.
Debates on the propriety of the current arbitrator selection system often touch
on what is referred to as 'transparency', a notion that includes public pleadings and
open hearings. On occasion, the more titillating term 'secrecy' is used to imply an
aura of something untoward about arbitration, perhaps evoking the omerta or code
of silence operating among criminal organisations in southern Italy. The
assumption of such loaded language seems to be that secrecy is suspect, perhaps,
because it breeds lack of accountability. 91 In any event, it is not clear who benefits
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Kingdom). For earlier debate on the subject, see also, Anthony De Palma, 'NAFTA's Powerful Little Secret' in
NewYork Times, 11 March 2001, s. 3-1 (late edn). In December 2001, an advertisement in the Washington Post
attacked investment arbitration under the headline 'Secret courts for corporations'. Sponsored by Ralph
Nader's 'Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch', the publication referred to arbitrators as judges whose
'identity[ies] can be kept secret indefinitely'. Washington Post, 5 December 2001, p. A-5.
See Noah Rubins, 'Opening the Investment Arbitration Process: At What Cost, For Whose Benefit?' in
Christian Klausegger et a/.(eds.), 2009 Austrian Arbitration Yearbook (2009), p. 483.
Of course, smart people sometimes know how to mask their bias. This remains a fact of life no matter what
the guiding principles on impartiality. Unless we establish a way to cut open an arbitrator's head to see what
is really going on (and then put things back together again), the best clues to partiality lie in the things that
actually have been said or written.
Thus, the Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States has issued directives to limit the role of
arbitrators with substantial connections to financial advisers. See supra n. 67 and accompanying text. The
directives mandate that arbitrators who decide consumer disputes involving brokerage houses should not be
drawn unduly from the ranks of stockbrokers or their lawyers.
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from lack of publicity.92 Host states themselves may resist the glare of publicity
when an expropriation risks exposing political corruption or victimisation of
ethnic groups through unfair spoliation.
Assertions of systemic bias can detract attention from consideration of more
concrete measures to promote arbitrator integrity. Thoughtful dialogue should
focus on how to articulate and implement ethical principles that avoid the two
principal paths by which arbitration may come into disrepute: (i) lax ethical canons
that tolerate arbitrator prejudgment and hidden links to parties, and (ii) unrealistic
rules that facilitate abusive arbitrator challenges designed to disrupt the arbitral
process.
Dialogue on arbitrator integrity becomes more plausible if linked to the way
arbitrators consider facts and legal arguments. Do cases suggest that arbitrators
invent treaty requirements not apparent on the face of the convention, in a way
analogous to the way some American judges find 'penumbra' rights in the United
States Constitution? Does bias show in weighing evidence or granting requests for
document production? Have arbitrators shut their eyes to discriminatory rhetoric
from host state legislators in parliamentary exchanges? 93
As mentioned earlier, institutional incentives to arbitrator bias can and do exist
when arbitrators are taken from one particular industry. 94 Analogies from
domestic arbitration do not always transplant well, however. When disputes
address a specific sector of the economy, arbitrators should not be closely identified
with the relevant industry. By contrast, when the distinction lies between the two
broad categories of host state and investors, few potential arbitrators of any
experience or ability will be able to avoid association with one group or the other.
Most will have links with both.
Moreover, when the alleged enticements to bad behaviour relate to the simple
dichotomy between investor and host state, the domestic paradigm loses much of
its force. As illustrated by the role of sovereign wealth funds, countries such as
China (traditionally considered a host state) often invest in countries such as the
United States (the investor state par excellence). Needless to say, incentives to
'repeat player' status can operate just as well for individuals known in the
arbitration community to be regularly appointed by host states.
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(ii) Disillusionment with arbitration

See e.g., M. Sornarajah, 'The Retreat of Neo-Liberalism in Investment Treaty Arbitration' in Catherine A.
Rogers and Roger P. Alford (eds.), The Future of Investment Arbitration (2009), p. 273.
See infra nn.104—105. The situation remains somewhat more nuanced in Venezuela, where a recent judicial
decision seems to have acknowledged the validity of binding international arbitration under certain
circumstances. See Ivor D. Mogolion-Rojas, 'Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal Restates ICSID Jurisdiction' in
(2009) 10 Int'l Arb. QL Rev. 103 (discussing an interpretative decision of 17 October 2008, given by the
Venezuelan Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal).
Many income tax treaties now incorporate OECD proposals to integrate arbitration mechanisms into the
so-called Mutual Agreement Procedure, which hitherto relied exclusively on negotiations among government
officials with a stake in the outcome of the case. See Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (OECD,
2008), Art. 25(5). Such provisions have been incorporated in recent protocols of treaties that the United States
has concluded with Belgium, Canada and Germany. See generally, William W. Park and David R. Tillinghast,
Income Tax Treaty Arbitration (2004); Marcus Desax and Marc Veit, 'Arbitration of Tax Treaty Disputes: the
OECD Proposal' in (2007) 23 Arb. Int'l 405.
For a sample of decisions favouring host states, seeAguaytia Energy LLC v. Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/13
(2008) (involving claim for alleged violation of a stabilization agreement); Metalpar SA v. Argentina, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/5 (2008) (turning on failure to establish breach of BIT protections); Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft
v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14 (2008) (finding of no jurisdiction by reason of inapplicability of
BIT's 'most favored nation' clause to import procedural shortcut); Plama Consortium Ltd v. Bulgaria, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/24 (2008) (concluding that claimant was not entitled to protections under Energy Charter
Treaty); MCI Power Group LCv. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6 (2007) (finding of no breach by Ecuador
of obligations under power purchase arrangement, annulment decision is pending); Continental Casualty Co. v.
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9 (2006) (dismissing most claims for asset 'pesification' on basis of United
States-Argentina BIT; upholding duty to maintain public order; and surviving claim for US$ 112 million
reduced to US$2.8 million plus interest); Consorzio Groupement LESI-DIPEKTA v. Algeria, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/8 (2005) (finding of no jurisdiction because claimant consortium possessed separate legal
personality from constituent companies). The United States, as host country, prevailed against Canadian
investors in the high-profile decisions of Mondev International, Ltd v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/
99/2 (2002); Laewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (2003), reprinted in (2003) 42
ILM 811; and Methanex Corp. v. United States, 3 August 2005, available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
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The suggestion that arbitrator bias is driven by systematic incentives will dovetail
into the current debate about whether investor—state arbitration continues to
inspire general confidence. 95 The argument that public appreciation for
investment arbitration has been dissipated rests on several factors, including
increased political sensitivity and inconsistent results. Concern about arbitrator
integrity constitutes one element in the mix of alleged malaise.
As a preliminary matter, it is far from clear that fear of bias derives from
governments and investors as opposed to pundits and academics. Even if
international arbitration does not inspire universal confidence, it seems to
command greater legitimacy than any reasonable alternative. The number of
countries that have recently opted out of the system, such as Bolivia and
Ecuador, 96 remains small enough to count on the fingers of one hand. Albeit not
without some hesitation, nations as well as investors seem to be sticking with
arbitration as a way of levelling the playing field. Even in the realm of taxation, a
most public domain, arbitration has gained ground. 97
In addition, no evidence supports the proposition that the arbitration system
operates as an assembly line of decisions that favours the investor. Host states seem
to win their share of cases, 98 however a win might be measured. 99 No reason exists
to think that arbitrators decided these matters other than according to their

Rectitude in International Arbitration

499

MethanexFinalAward.pdf. In comparing interests of industrialised and non-industrialised countries, a fairminded observer would also note awards in favour of investors from developing countries, as in Desert Line
Projects LLCv. Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17 (2008), in which 'moral damages' were awarded when an
Omanian company charged with building roads was expelled from worksites at gun point by governmentsponsored gangs. See also, Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States (NAFTA claim under UNCITRAL Rules and
administered by ICSID, June 2009), available at www.state.gov/s/1/c 10986.htm (dismissing Canadian
mining company's claim arising from proposal to mine in California and finding federal and state regulations
did not violate NAFTA); Empresa Elictrica del Ecuador, Inc. (EMELEC) v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/9
(2009) (dismissing a US$1.7 billion claim for lack of jurisdiction); 7X4 Spectrum deArg., SA v. Argentina, ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/5 (2008) (a split tribunal rejecting a claim brought under the Netherlands-Argentina BIT
after determining that claimant's ultimate owner was an Argentine citizen); FraportAG Frankfurt Airport Sews.
Worldwide v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25 (2007) (dismissing German company's claim on
jurisdictional grounds).
Winning and losing implicate the amount of awards as well as findings of liability. If a US$100 million claim
results in a US$1 million award, the claimant may not really feel that it prevailed. In this connection, see
Susan Franck's study of more than 100 investment awards, finding that investors brought treaty claims for
US$343 million on the average, but collected only US$10 million on the average. Susan D. Franck, 'An
Empirical Analysis of Investment Treaty Awards' in (2007) 101 Am. Soc'y Int'l L Proc. 459; Susan D. Franck,
'Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration' in (2007) 86 NCL Rev. 1, 49-50, 64;
Susan D. Franck, 'Empiricism and International Law: Insights for Investment Treaty Dispute Resolution' in
(2008) 48 Va. J Int'l L 767; Susan D. Franck, 'International Investment Arbitration: Winning, Losing and
Why' in (2009) 7 Colum. FDI Persp. 1, available at http://vcc.columbia.edu/pubs/documents/
SusanFranckPerspective-Final.pdf. In at least one case the claimant established liability but not damages.
Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v. Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22 (2008), para. 814.
In evaluating the value of arbitration, much depends on the observer's perspective. Few Americans have
trouble understanding why Ugandans of Indian origin, dispossessed by Idi Amin, might not have relished
the prospect of seeking redress before courts in Kampala during the 1970s. Yet these same Americans might
bridle at the offence to sovereignty when a Canadian asks for arbitration to repair loss occasioned by a
xenophobic state jury. See e.g., Laewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (2003),
reprinted in (2003) 42 ILM 811 (involving a US$500 million Mississippi verdict (later coupled with a
US$625 million security requirement) against a Canadian funeral company for breach of agreements
related to burial insurance, where the transactions giving rise to the lawsuit were valued at 1 per cent of the
amount awarded).
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particular substantive or jurisdictional merits. The cases show no propensity of
arbitrators to rubber stamp investors' claims. Host states can be expected to win
when the claimant's legal position is weak, and to lose when the evidence and law
run the other way. Arbitrators are in fact capable of getting it right on the facts and
the law.
It bears noting that a rational investor would normally be expected to prefer
national courts, given that arbitration implicates transaction costs in convening
and funding a private tribunal whose decisions must be enforced through a
complex network of treaties transcending multiple jurisdictions. These transaction
costs seem to be outweighed by apprehension with respect to domestic courts of
the country that allegedly has been discriminating against foreigners or
expropriating their assets.100
To some extent, both investment and commercial arbitration have become
victims of their own success. Their general acceptance often makes them objects of
criticism by observers who forget what led to arbitration in the first place: a
genuine concern about politicised justice in national courts. Even if accepted for
want of anything better, as a 'second best' solution, arbitration continues to provide
what some have called 'enclaves of justice' for resolution of international economic
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See Jan Paulsson, 'Enclaves of Justice' in Transnat'l Disp. Mgmt (September 2007), available at
www.transnational-dispute-management.com/ (subscription required). A wholly separate debate, of course,
surrounds whether investment treaties do in fact benefit developing nations. Many of the arguments in this
connection have been summarised in the recent work of Prof. Susan Franck, evaluating both the arguments
in favour of foreign investment and the scepticism expressed by scholars such as Profs Susan Rose-Ackerman
and Jennifer Tobin. Susan D. Franck, 'Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the
Rule of Law' in (2007) 19 Pac. McGeorge Global Bus. and Den. LJ 337. See generally, Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa
Sachs (eds.), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment (2009).
See William W. Park, 'Arbitration and the Fisc: NAFTA's "Tax Veto'" in (2001) 2 Chi. J Int'IL 231; William
W. Park, 'Arbitrability and Tax' in Loukas A. Mistelis and Stavros L. Brekoulakis (eds.), Arbitrability:
International and Comparative Perspectives (2008), p. 179, adapted from William W. Park, 'Tax, Arbitration and
Investment Treaties' in Catherine A. Rogers and Roger P. Alford (eds.), The Future of Investment Arbitration
(2009).
The new US model for treaty-based investment arbitration clarifies the contours of substantive investor
protection with respect to 'indirect' expropriation through regulatory actions that decrease the value of an
investor's property, providing that governmental regulations will not normally constitute expropriation if
non-discriminatory and designed to protect legitimate welfare objectives. US implementation of the new
patterns began with the United States' free trade agreements with Singapore, Chile and Uruguay, as well as
the Central American Free Trade Agreement. On the 2004 State Department model bilateral investment
treaty, see e.g., David A. Gantz, 'The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions' in (2004) 19 Am. U Int'lL Rev.
679; Mark Kantor, 'The New Draft Model U.S. BIT: Noteworthy Developments' in (2004) 21 J Int'lArb.
383; Barton Legum, 'Lessons Learned from the NAFTA: the New Generation of U.S. Investment Treaty
Arbitration Provisions' in (2004) 19 ICSID Rev.—Foreign Investment LJ 344.
See generally, Emmanuel Gaillard, 'The Denunciation of the ICSID Convention', NYLJ, 26 June 2007, p. 1;
Marco Tulio Montanes, 'Note, Bolivia Denounces ICSID Convention' in (2007) 46 ILM 969.
.See Juan Manuel Marchan, 'The Treatment of Arbitration in the New Constitution of Ecuador' in (2008/
2009) News and Notes from Inst, for Transnat'l Arb. (Autumn/Winter) 1, 6-8 (discussing art. 422 of the
Ecuadorian Constitution approved by referendum on 28 September 2008). In May 2009, President Correa
of Ecuador announced again that his government is considering withdrawing from the ICSID system.
The esteemed Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo argued that foreign investors in Latin America should submit
expropriation disputes to local courts. Announced in 1868, the doctrine received fuller expression in his
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controversies, 101 serving as the best means to enhance the rule of law in a global
marketplace lacking any omni-national courts or sheriffs.
Although no one should belittle the need for vigilance with respect to bias in
arbitration, a dialogue on the topic must be placed in context. Nations that are
unhappy can revise existing models, as witnessed by the new paradigm that shows
increased understanding of host states' positions, such as government veto of
arbitration in tax matters 102 and limits on arbitration claims based on general
welfare legislation.103
Moreover, host states can also walk away from the process entirely, as some have
recently done. Bolivia denounced its adhesion to the ICSID Convention, 104 and
Ecuador's new constitution generally prohibits treaties or other international
instruments that require arbitration in commercial disputes with private parties. 105
Most host states, however, have remained with the investor-state arbitration
system.
Critiques of arbitration tend toward a cyclical character, given that fashion
invades the realm of ideas no less than the length for hemlines on ladies' dresses or
the angle at which students tilt their caps. The recent actions of Bolivia and
Ecuador echo the ideology of the 'new international economic order' of three
decades earlier, which in turn took its cue from the 'Calvo doctrine' of the late
nineteenth century. 106 The doctrines of both attempted unsuccessfully to limit
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(c) Mechanics of Challenge: Basic Texts
Challenges to arbitrators in investor—state disputes would normally be brought
under either the ICSID Convention or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 111

treatise on public international law, stating that foreign nations should not intervene in South America to
protect private property and debts. Le droit international theorique et pratique (5th edn, 1896), vol. 1, ss. 185-205,
pp. 322-351; ibid. vol. 3, ss. 1280-1296, pp. 142-155. The corollary was that claims for improper takings of
property were to be brought by the foreign investors, and were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of host
state law and courts. See K. Lipstein, 'The Place of the Calvo Clause in International Law' in (1945) 22 Brit.
IS Inf IL 130; William W. Park, 'Legal Issues in the Third World's Economic Development' in (1981) 61 BU
LRev. 1321.
See generally, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA Res. 3281, UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp
No. 31, UN Doc. A/9631 (12 December 1974); Declaration on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order, GA Res. 3201, UN GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, UN Doc. A/9559 (1 May
1974).
GA Res. 3281, art. 2(2)(c). The Charter was adopted by a vote of 120 to 6, with 10 abstentions. The six
negative votes were cast by Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, United
Kingdom and United States. Those abstaining were Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, Norway and Spain.
See Award on the Merits in Dispute between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co./California Asiatic Oil Co. and
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, (1978) 17 ILM 1 ('TOPCO Award').
See generally, Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez and William W. Park, 'The New Face of Investment Arbitration in
(2003)28 Yale J Int'l 1365.
Under some investment treaties, investors and host states may have the option to choose other arbitration
regimes. In addition, arbitration might arise under the terms of a concession agreement containing its own
arbitration clause. In some instances, arbitration claims have been filed on the same set of facts under both
ICSID and ICC Rules. See S Pac. Prop., Ltd v. Egypt, Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3 (1988). The
ICC award was subject to extensive discussion in the French judicial actions that led to its vacatur. See Cour
d'appel de Paris, 12 July 1984, translated in (1984) 23 ILM 1048; Cour de Cassation, 6 January 1987,
translated in (1987) 26 ILM 1004. For the ICSID award of 20 May 1992, see (1995) 3 ICSID Rep. 189 at
241. See also, W. Laurence Craig, 'The Final Chapter in the Pyramids Case: Discounting an ICSID Award
for Annulment Risk' in (1993) 8 ICSID Bee.—Foreign Investment L.J. 264.
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investor—state arbitration, which at the time was a creature of contractual
investment concessions.107
The 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States provided that any
'controversy [about expropriation of foreign property] shall be settled under the
domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals'. 108 This approach was
ultimately rejected in arbitration awards 109 as well as by developing countries
themselves when they came to see that the absence of an option for arbitration
risked putting a chill on welfare-enhancing economic cooperation. The fact that
such discredited ideologies again become trendy in certain academic and political
circles does not mean they have merit. 110
Central to sound analysis is the fact that investor-state arbitration is a dynamic
process based on informed negotiation. Unlike American credit card companies
that impose arbitration clauses through fine print in a monthly statement,
investment and free trade agreements are concluded under the glare of public
scrutiny by governments that represent both capital-exporting and capitalimporting concerns.
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In theory at least, challenges might also arise under other institutional or ad hoc rules. For example, art.
24(3) of the 2004 United States Model BIT provides that a claimant may submit a request for arbitration
under the Rules of ICSID, the ICSID Additional Facility, UNCITRAL, or 'if the claimant and respondent
agree, to any other arbitration institution or under any other arbitration rules'. US State Department,
Treaty between the Government of the United States and the Government of [Country} concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (2004), art. 24(3), available at www.state.gov/
documents/organization/38710.pdf. The same language appears in Free Trade Agreements, e.g. Art. 11.16
of the South Korea-United States FTA (pending ratification). Free Trade Agreement between the United
States and the Republic of Korea, Art. 11.16, United States-South Korea, 30 June 2007, available at
www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/ free-trade-agreements/korus-fta. By contrast, Art. 1120 of NAFTA limits
itself to the ICSID, the ICSID Additional Facility, and UNCITRAL. North American Free Trade
Agreement, United States-Canada-Mexico, ch. 11, Art. 1120, 17 December 1992, (1993) 32 ILM 289.
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are not to be confused with the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration ('UNCITRAL Model Law'). Although the former entails procedural
rules for handling an arbitration arising from a governing instrument that warrants application of the
UNCITRAL Rules, the latter constitutes a matrix of what UNCITRAL deems to be a 'model' national
arbitration statute. Both the UNCITRAL Rules and Model Law address arbitrator challenge, and
unsurprisingly, display vast similarities.
The full text of ICSID Convention, Art. 14(1) contains both ethical and professional components. The full
text reads: 'Persons designated to serve on the Panels shall be persons of high moral character and
recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to
exercise independent judgment. Competence in the field of law shall be of particular importance in the case
of persons on the Panel of Arbitrators'. ICSID Convention, Art. 14(1). See generally, Audley Sheppard,
Arbitrator Independence in ICSID Arbitration' in Christina Binder et al. (eds.), International Investment Lawfor
the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (2009), pp. 131, 147-148. Reforms proposed by Mr
Sheppard include, inter alia, (i) a change in the grounds for challenge from 'manifest' lack of independence to
'justifiable doubts' as to independence and impartiality; and (ii) decisions on challenge are to be made by an
independent ad hoc committee rather than the challenged arbitrator's colleagues on the tribunal.
Rule 6(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules requires each arbitrator, prior or during the tribunal's first session,
to sign a declaration affirming, inter alia, that the individual will 'judge fairly as between the parties,
according to the applicable law' and attach a statement of past and present professional, business, and other
relationships with the parties, as well as any other circumstance that might cause the arbitrator's reliability
for independent judgment to be questioned by a party. In signing the declaration, the arbitrator assumes a
continuing obligation to prompdy notify ICSID of any such relationship that subsequendy arises during the
proceedings. ICSID Rules of Arbitration Procedure, rule 6(2), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf.
ICSID Convention, Art. 57, provides as follows: A party may propose to a Commission or Tribunal the
disqualification of any of its members on account of any fact indicating a manifest lack of the qualities
required by paragraph (1) of Article 14. A party to arbitration proceedings may, in addition, propose the
disqualification of an arbitrator on the ground that he was ineligible for appointment to the Tribunal under
Section 2 of Chapter IV.
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each of which provides the framework for private claims under BITs and FTAs. 112
Although these systems share some common elements, their treatment of
challenges will diverge with respect to two key elements: the person who decides
whether the challenge is justified, and the possibility of judicial review. On both
matters, UNCITRAL arbitration falls toward the commercial arbitration
model. 113
In ICSID arbitration, the touchstone will be the words in Article 14 of the
ICSID Convention, which speak of the individual's ability to 'exercise independent
judgment'. 114 This requirement is supplemented by a certification of independence
made by the arbitrator at the beginning of the proceedings. 115 A party to the
arbitration may propose disqualification of an arbitrator on account of any fact
indicating a 'manifest' inability to meet that standard. 116
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See ibid. Art. 58. The challenged arbitrator would first be given the opportunity to 'furnish explanations'. If
the challenge relates to a majority of the arbitral tribunal, or if the remaining two members are equally
divided, the disqualification decision will be made by the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council,
a post filled ex officio by the President of the World Bank pursuant to Art. 5 of the ICSID Convention. See
generally, Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2001), pp. 1202-1206. See also the
procedure amplified in rule 9 of the Arbitration Rules adopted by the ICSID Administrative Council
pursuant to Art. 6 of the ICSID Convention. ICSID Rules of Arbitration Procedure, rule 9, available at
http://icsid.worldbanlc.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf.
ICSID Convention, Art. 52. The limited grounds for challenge do not include an arbitrator's lack of
independent thinking. An award may be set aside for the following reasons: (1) improper constitution of the
tribunal; (2) tribunal excess of authority; (3) corruption of a tribunal member; (4) serious departure from a
fundamental rule of procedure; or (5) failure of the award to state reasons. Ibid. Art. 52(1). This challenge is
made not to national courts, but pursuant to an internal ICSID process triggered by a letter to the ICSID
Secretary General. Review is conducted by an ad hoc committee of three persons with authority to annul
the award in part or in total. If an award is annulled, either party may require that it be submitted to a new
tribunal.
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules, GA Res. 31/98, art. 10(1), UN
Doc. A/31/17 (15 December 1976), available at www.adr. org/sp.asp?id=22091. A similar formulation
exists in art. 12 of the UNCITAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, GA Res. 40/72,
art. 12, UN Doc. A/40/17/Annex I and A/61/17/Annex I (21 June 1985) ('UNCITRAL Model Law').
The wording in art. 12 contains an unfortunate (albeit perhaps unavoidable) complexity with respect to who
gets to decide arbitrator challenges, distinguishing between situations (i) 'when the initial appointment was
made by an appointing authority' (situations in which /competent to hear the challenge lies with the same
appointing authority); (ii) 'when the initial appointment was not made by an appointing authority' (in which
case the challenge will be heard by a previously designated authority); and (iii) 'all other cases', whereby 'the
decision on the challenge will be made . .. [by the] appointing authority as provided for in article 6' of the
Rules, under which the Permanent Court of Arbitration serves by default as the entity to designate an
appointing authority if the parties cannot agree. UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 11.
See New York Convention. In some instances, the relevant treaty framework would be found in the
Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, commonly known as the 1975
Panama Convention. See 9 USC ch. 3 (2006). Although similar in their basic structure, the two conventions
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When a dissatisfied litigant contests an arbitrator's fitness in an ICSID
proceeding, the remaining arbitrators normally determine whether the individual
lacks the capacity to exercise independent judgment. 117 Any review of the resulting
award would be made by an ICSID-appointed panel rather than national judges
who might conduct their own review of independence and impartiality. 118 By
contrast, outside ICSID, challenges to arbitrators in commercial arbitrations
would initially be heard by the relevant supervisory institution and then again
come before whatever national court is charged with considering motions to
review awards.
Challenge under the UNCITRAL Rules differs in procedural mechanics,
notwithstanding a basic similarity in the standards themselves. Article 10 provides
for challenge if circumstances give rise to 'justifiable doubts' about the arbitrator's
impartiality or independence. 119 Unless the other side agrees or the arbitrator
withdraws voluntarily, the challenge decision will be made by the appropriate
'appointing authority' that constituted (or would otherwise have constituted) the
tribunal itself.120
In UNCITRAL arbitration, as in ordinary commercial cases, the ultimate
validity of any appointing authority decision will be subject to review by national
courts under the appropriate arbitration statute or within the framework of the
New York Convention. 121
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(d) Filling the Gaps
(i) Effect of institutional rules and case law
Implementation of ICSID and UNCITRAL challenge standards would be a very
difficult job indeed if investor—state cases were isolated from lessons learned in
other varieties of arbitration. Notions such as ability 'to exercise independent
judgment' 125 or 'justifiable doubts' as to impartiality or independence 126 touch on
notions of proper behaviour shared with other arbitral systems.
In examining a motion to disqualify an arbitrator in an investor-state case, the
decisions in analogous commercial arbitrations will inevitably have some
influence. Consideration will be given to how things have been done pursuant to
institutional rules, national statutes, other multilateral treaties (such as the New
York Convention) and the 'soft law' of professional guidelines. These different

differ in significant respects. For example, the Panama Convention does not require judges to refer parties
to arbitration, or set forth conditions that must be satisfied by the party seeking award enforcement.
Moreover, only the Panama Convention contains reference to arbitration rules (those of the Inter-American
Commercial Arbitration Commission) that apply in default of party choice. See generally, Albert Jan van den
Berg, 'The New York Convention 1958 and Panama Convention 1975: Redundancy or Compatibility?' in
(1989) 5 Arb. Int'l 214;John Bowman, 'The Panama Convention and Its Implementation Under the Federal
Arbitration Act' in (2000) 11 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 1.
Rules governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID/11, Sch. C, art. 8 (10 April 2006),
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ StaticFiles/facility/AFR_English-final.pdf ('ICSID
Additional Facility Rules').
Ibid. art. 15(5) ('Disqualification of Arbitrators').
The Additional Facility Rules might apply in disputes where ICSID jurisdiction would not otherwise exist
because either the host state or the investor's state is not party to the Washington Convention. For example,
in the Metalclad case, an American company filed an Additional Facility Claim related to a hazardous waste
disposal facility in Mexico. The arbitrators found that Mexican regulatory action denied 'fair and equitable
treatment' and constituted expropriation without adequate compensation. Mexico petitioned to have the
award set aside by the British Columbia Supreme Court, which had jurisdiction by virtue of the
arbitration's official situs fixed in Vancouver notwithstanding that for convenience hearings had been held
in Washington. The court found that some but not all of the arbitrators' conclusions exceeded their
jurisdiction. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/l (2000) (Award),
reprinted in (2001) 16 Int'l Arb. Rep. 62.
ICSID Convention, Art. 14(1); ICSID Additional Facility Rules, Sch. C, art. 8.
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 10(1); see also, UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 12(2) ('An arbitrator may be
challenged only if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or
independence, or if he does not possess qualifications agreed to by the parties').
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In some cases an arbitrator's challenge will take place under what might be seen
as a hybrid process under the ICSID Additional Facility. In such instances, the
arbitration will be supervised by ICSID, under procedures similar to those of
conventional ICSID cases, but outside the framework of the Washington
Convention. The rule for challenge remains the ability to 'exercise independent
judgment', 122 and the decision will normally be made by the challenged
arbitrator's remaining colleagues. 123 However, national courts might also have
their say on the matter when asked to vacate an award pursuant to their own
standards of arbitrator fitness.124
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128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

136
137
138

139
140
141
142

/CC Rules, art. 9(2).
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 10.
UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 12.
AAA/ABA Code of Ethics, supra n. 18 at Canon II.
IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at General Standard (1).
London Court of International Arbitration Rules (1998), arts. 5.2, 10.3 ('LCIA Rules').
UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 34(2)(b)(ii).
IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at Explanation to General Standard 2.
See AAA/ABA Code of Ethics, supra n. 18 at Canon 11(A)(2); IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at General Standard
2; ICC Rules, art. 7; ICSID Rules of Arbitration Procedure, rule 6(2); LCIA Arbitration Rules, art. 5.3;
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 9. For discussion of a particularly problematic set of standards, see M.
Scott Donahey, 'California and Arbitrator Failure to Disclose' in (2007) 1\JInt'lArb. 389.
See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 9; LCIA Arbitration Rules, art. 10.3.
See ICC Rules, art. 7(2).
IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at General Standards 2 and 3, in particular General Standards 2(c), 2(d) and
Explanation to General Standard 3(a).
LCIA Arbitration Rules, art. 6.1.
ICSID Convention, art. 39.
UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 11(1).
/CC Rules, art. 9(1).
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arbitration standards often follow roughly similar paths, albeit with different
emphasis or minor variation.
For example, the ICC Rules speak of arbitrator independence, but not
impartiality. 127 By contrast, impartiality as well as independence has been
explicitly addressed in the UNCITRAL Rules, 128 the UNCITRAL Model Law, 129
the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics, 130 the IBA Guidelines 131 and the LCIA Rules. 132
Under the UNCITRAL Model Law and other statutes that follow its paradigm,
arbitrator bias as a ground for award vacatur seems to be subsumed under the
general rubric of'public policy' violation. 133 The IBA Guidelines mention 'actual
bias' as a ground for declining appointment. 134
Most standards require an arbitrator's disclosure of circumstances that may
cause doubts as to his or her ability to serve impartially and independently during
a proceeding. 135 Some make reference to 'justifiable' doubts, 136 while others direct
the arbitrator to ask whether the questionable circumstances would cause doubt 'in
the eyes of the parties'. 137 The IBA Guidelines include both 'justifiable doubts'
and doubts 'in the eyes of the parties' as factors for an arbitrator to consider. 138
Some rules address arbitrator nationality. When litigants are of different
nationalities, the LCIA Rules 139 and the ICSID Convention 140 generally provide
that an arbitrator may not have the same nationality as either party. Conversely,
the UNCITRAL Model Law provides that 'no person shall be precluded by reason
of his nationality from acting as an arbitrator', unless the parties agree
otherwise. 141 The ICC Rules direct the ICC Court to consider an arbitrator's
nationality in some circumstances. 142
In arbitration outside the treaty-based investor-state context, a decision on
challenge for alleged conflict will often need to be made on the basis of both
arbitration rules and applicable statute. Imagine, for example, arbitration
conducted in England under the rules of the LCIA. One side complains that the
arbitrator has prejudged some vital question by statements made in a procedural
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(ii) Specificity of investment cases
Assertions about the uniqueness of investor-state cases often overstate the
proposition. 149 A clear cross-pollination of national and professional ethical
standards exists as between commercial and investor-state cases. In reality,
investor-state arbitration holds no monopoly on the 'private judging' that affects
societal and economic wellbeing. 150 Ethical standards in commercial cases fertilise
decisions in investment cases, and vice versa.

143
144
145

146
147

LCIA Arbitration Rules, art. 10.3.
Ibid. art. 10.2.
Under LCIA Rules, challenges are heard by a Division of the LCIA Court itself, usually pursuant to written
memorials and on occasion (albeit rarely) with oral argument. Unlike many other arbitral institutions, the
LCIA publishes a sanitised version of challenge decisions to guide future litigants with respect to
nominations or challenges. See Geoff Nicholas and Constantine Partasides, 'LCIA Court Decisions on
Challenges to Arbitrators: A Proposal to Publish, Annex: Survey of Exiting LCIA Challenge Decisions 2007'
in (2007) 23 Arb. Ml 1 at pp. 2 1 ^ 1 .
Arbitration Act 1996, s. 24(1) (Eng.).
Ibid. s. 68.
Ibid. s. 33. For an illustration under the ICC Rules, see discussion of challenge in AT&TCorp. v. Saudi Cable
Co. [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 127 (CA) (Eng.), available at 2000 WL 571190. In light of the fact that the
arbitration began in 1995, the application to set aside partial awards invoked s. 23 of the 1950 Arbitration
Act (not the 1996 Act) that speaks of arbitrator 'misconduct'. Ibid. 136-137.
One recent essay suggested that commercial arbitration was conducted 'entirely by and for professionals'.
Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez and W. Michael Reisman, 'How Well are Investment Awards Reasoned?' in
Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez and W. Michael Reisman (eds.), The Reasons Requirement in International Investment
Arbitration: Critical Case Studies (2008), pp. 1, 2. If this were true, of course, professors who teach about policy
aspects of business disputes should be exposed as charlatans, and large portions of their scholarly work
eliminated as meaningless. Decisions like Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985), which address safeguards involving antitrust claims, could be removed from national arbitration law,
along with cases interpreting the language of New York Convention, Art. V(2)(b) on public policy violations.
Surprisingly, the authors also suggest that international commercial awards are 'rarely published',
notwithstanding the extensive collections of awards published in places such as the ICC Recueil des
Sentences, Mealey's International Arbitration Reports, Journal de droit international, ASA Bulletin and
Revue de l'arbitrage.
For an exploration of the arguments on both sides, see Stephan Wilske et al, 'International Investment Treaty
Arbitration and International Commercial Arbitration: Conceptual Difference or Only a "Status Thing"?'
in (2008) 1 Contemp. Asia Arb. J 213.
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order. The challenging party would begin by citing article 10.3 of the LCIA
Arbitration Rules permitting challenge on the basis of circumstances 'that give rise
to justifiable doubts as to [the arbitrator's] impartiality or independence'. 143 There
might also be a citation to article 10.2 of the LCIA Rules, which makes reference
to an arbitrator who 'does not act fairly and impartially as between the parties'. 144
If the institutional challenge before the LCIA fails,145 the unhappy litigant might
also bring a court challenge under English statute for 'justifiable doubts' 146 as to
the arbitrator's impartiality, or an application to annul the award itself for 'serious
irregularity', 147 including failure to '[a]ct fairly and impartially' as between the
parties. 148
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(e) Transnational Standards and 'Soft Law'
Increasingly, conflicts of interest implicate non-governmental instruments such as
the professional standards issued by the International Bar Association or the
American Arbitration Association. To some extent such guidelines will be
supplemented by the writings of scholars and practitioners setting forth what
might be termed the 'lore' of international arbitral procedure. 154
The use of the term 'soft law' to designate such guidelines has led to unfortunate
misinterpretation and misapprehension. Some observers express concern that nongovernmental instruments will undermine the reasonable measure of certainty
sought by merchants and investors to guide decision-making. The right critique
has been aimed at the wrong target. 155
When properly applied, such standards can enhance certainty by providing an
alternative to ad hoc rule-making by jurists whose facile eloquence may articulate
One unfortunate effect of BIT-arbitration puffery lies in its tendency to reinforce stereotypes of investorstate arbitration as so extraordinary as to be somehow illegitimate. A better course might be to acknowledge
that all international arbitration is designed to enhance procedural and political neutrality by granting
decision-making power to persons other than the national bodies with a stake in the outcome.
For example, insurance arbitrators play a vital role in maintaining respect for the sanctity of contract, which
in turn permits manufacturers to meet otherwise disruptive risks. Gas price revision arbitration affects how
much people pay for heat in the winter. And arbitration of pharmaceutical licence disputes can have an
impact on the price of drugs.
See e.g., the LIAMCO arbitration with respect to the Libyan expropriation of US assets, discussed in Libyan
American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F.Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated, 684 F2d
1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (unpublished table decision). See also, TOPCO Award, supra n. 109.
See e.g., Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, 'Major Criteria for International Arbitrators in Shaping an Efficient
Procedure' in Arbitration in the Next Decade (ICC Int'l Ct Arb. Bull. Spec. Supp. 1999), p. 49; Jack J. Coe, Jr,
'Pre-Hearing Techniques to Promote Speed and Cost-Effectiveness: Some Thoughts Concerning Arbitral
Process Design' in (2002) 2 Pepp. Disp. Resol. LJ53; Paul Friedland, 'Combining Civil Law and Common Law
Elements in the Presentation of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration' in (1997) Int'l Arb. Rep.
(September) 25; Howard M. Holtzmann, 'Balancing the Need for Certainty and Flexibility in International
Arbitration Procedure' in Richard B. Lillich and Charles N. Brower (eds.), International Arbitration in the 21st
Century (1993), p. 3; Mark Huleatt-James and Robert Hunter, 'The Laws and Rules Applicable to Evidence
in International Arbitration Procedure and Some Issues Relating to Their Determination and Application'
in Geoffrey M. Beresford Hartwell (ed.), The Commercial Way to Justice (1997), p. 45; Martin Hunter, 'Modern
Trends in the Presentation of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration' in (1992) 3 Am. Rev. Int'l
Arb. 204; Julian D.M. Lew and Laurence Shore, 'Harmonizing Cultural Differences in International
Commercial Arbitration' in (1999) Disp. Resol. J (August) 32; Andreas F Lowenfeld, 'The Two-Way Mirror:
International Arbitration as Comparative Procedure' in (1985) 7 Mich. YB Int'l Legal Stud. 163; James J.
Myers, 'Ten Techniques for Managing Arbitration Hearings' in (1996) Disp. Resol. J (January-March) 28;
Lucy Reed and Jonathan Sutcliffe, 'The "Americanization" of International Arbitration?' in (2001) Int'l Arb.
Rep. (April) 37; John Uff, 'The Bill Tompkins Memorial Lecture 1994' in (1995) 61 Arbitration 18.
See W. Michael Reisman, 'Soft Law Instruments Should have No Place in International Arbitration', paper
delivered at the Institute for Transnational Arbitration Academy Council and American Society of
International Law, Soft Law Symposium, 9 April 2008, Washington D.C.
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Nor are the public effects of commercial arbitration any less real than those of
treaty-based investor-state cases. 151 If the financial crisis of 2008 demonstrates
anything, it teaches that private choices have public consequences. Contract
disputes affect the world's aggregate social and economic welfare no less than
treaty controversies, 152 and breaches of international law end up being decided in
commercial arbitration just as in treaty-based proceedings. 153
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William W. Park, 'National Law and Commercial Justice' in (1989) 63 Tul. L Rev. 647; William W. Park,
Neutrality, Predictability and Economic Cooperation, 12 J. Int'l Arb. 99 (1995); William W. Park, 'Why
Courts Review Arbitral Awards' in Robert Briner et al. (eds.), Recht der Intemationalen Wirtschqft und
Streiterledigung im 21. Jahrhundert: Liber Amicorum Karl-Heinz, Bockstiegel (2001), p. 595.
William W. Park, 'Arbitration's Protean Nature: the Value of Rules and the Risks of Discretion' in (2003) 19
Arb. Int'l 279; William W. Park, 'Private Disputes and the Public Good' in (2005) 20 Am. UInt'l L Rev. 903;
William W. Park, 'Procedural Default Rules Revisited' in Julian D.M. Lew and Loukas A. Mistelis (eds.),
Arbitration Insights (2007), p. 360; William W. Park, 'The Procedural Soft Law of International Arbitration' in
Loukas A Mistelis and Julian D.M. Lew (eds.), Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration (2006), p. 141.
See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), para. 24, p. 136. Rawls affirmed, inter alia, that to be just, rules
should be uninformed by any existing litigation strategy, not created in function of what some might call the
'ouch test', which looks to see who gets hurt by a particular rule. On some matters the 'veil of ignorance'
already finds limited recognition in arbitration. For example, although different methods exist to calculate
arbitrators' fees (ICC looks to the amount in dispute, while AAA and LCIA base fees on time spent), no
institution gives an arbitrator discretion to opt for one approach or the other (ad valorem or hourly) after
seeing how the case develops.
Similar principles obtain with respect to the substantive law applied to the merits of the dispute, where most
business managers seek predictability in normal commercial relations. As the late Dr Francis Mann noted,
'no merchant of any experience would ever be prepared to submit to the unforeseeable consequences which
arise from application of undefined and undefmable standards described as rules of a lex of unknown origin'.
F.A. Mann, 'Introduction II to Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration' (Thomas E. Carbonneau (ed.), 1990),
pp. xix, xxi.
See IBA Working Party, 'Commentary on the New IBA Rules of Evidence in International Commercial
Arbitration' in (2000) 2 Bus. L Int'l 16 at p. 17; see also, Michael Btihler and Carroll Dorgan, 'Witness
Testimony Pursuant to the IBA Rules of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration: Novel or Tested
Standards?' in (2000) 17 J Int'l Arb. 3. The rules are available at www.ibanet.org.
The American College of Commercial Arbitrators published a compendium of'Best Practices' for business
arbitration. College of Commercial Arbitrators, Guide to Best Practices in Commercial Arbitration (Curtis E. von
Kann et al. (eds.), 2006); see also, ICC Comm'n on Arbitration, Publ'n No. 843, Techniquesfor Controlling Time
and Cost in Arbitration (2007,), available at www.iccwbo.org/uploaded Files/TimeCost_E.pdf; UNCITRAL,
Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings (1996), available at www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/
arb-notes/arb-notes-e.pdf.
For a recent survey of these non-governmental initiatives, see William W. Park, 'Three Studies in Change' in
Arbitration of International Business Disputes (2006), pp. 3, 45-65.
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'general legal principles' that constitute little more than a figleaf covering personal
preferences. 156 If crafted with intelligence, professional guidelines present a better
guess about the parties' shared ex ante expectations than the unbridled discretion of
overly clever arbitrators who pursue their own agendas. 157
Soft law instruments thus represent one check on the imperial decision-maker,
and perhaps the only standard that can permit elaboration of procedural law
through what John Rawls called the 'veil of ignorance' about the contingencies of
a rule's application. 158 Arbitrators who interpret preexisting norms have less
leeway to pick rules that will lead to the outcome favoured by their subjective
predispositions. 159
Ethical soft law forms part of a more general phenomenon by which standards
elaborated by professional associations serve to guide arbitral decision-making in
matters related to evidence 160 and case management. 161 Built on arbitral lore
memorialised in articles, treatises and learned papers, these guidelines represent
what might be called the 'soft law' of arbitral procedure, in distinction to the firmer
norms imposed by statutes and treaties. 162 Nothing prevents parties from agreeing
to override the guidelines, which enter the arbitration only when such agreement
proves impossible.
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(f) Professional Guidelines

(i) International Bar Association Guidelines
Perhaps the most oft-cited of these standards can be found in the IBA
Guidelines. 165 Rightly or wrongly, this list has entered the canon of sacred
documents cited when an arbitrator's independence is contested. The general
standards are both objective and subjective. According to the IBA Guidelines,
arbitrators should decline appointment if they have doubts about their ability to be
impartial or independent 166 or if justifiable doubts exist from a reasonable third
person's perspective. 167
In practice, the dominant test as elaborated injudicial and institutional decisions
will be an objective one. Inevitably, challenges by parties will focus on arbitrators
who have already discounted any self-doubts they might have. Arbitrators who
consider themselves incapable of performing their duties with integrity will
normally decline appointment or resign. It would be odd to hear an arbitrator say,
'Please note that I'm probably biased. But let me know if you think otherwise'. By
contrast, the IBA Guidelines set forth a more subjective standard for disclosure,
requiring communication of facts or circumstances that may 'in the eyes of the
parties' give rise to doubts about impartiality or independence. 168
A disclosure does not necessarily mean disqualification. Evaluation of the
potential conflict must be made by the parties as well as whatever body will hear

IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at General Standard 2; see Markham Ball, 'Probity Deconstructed: How Helpful,
Really, are the New International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International
Arbitration?' in (2004) 15 World Arb. and Mediation Rep. 333;Jan Paulsson, 'Ethics and Codes of Conduct for
a Multi-Disciplinary Institute' in (2004) 70 Arbitration 193 at pp. 198-199.
The 2004 AAA/ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes represents a modification of
an earlier code adopted in 1977. See generally, Paul D. Friedland and John M. Townsend, 'Commentary on
Changes to the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association' in (2003-2004)
Disp. Resol. J (November-January) 8; Ben H. Sheppard, Jr, 'A New Era of Arbitrator Ethics for the United
States' in (2005) 21 Arb. Int'l9\.
The IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest should not be confused with the less controversial IBA Rules of
Ethics for International Arbitrators. The latter include broad, and somewhat bland, admonitions about
being competent, diligent, efficient and remaining 'free from bias'. See IBA Rules of Ethics for International
Arbitrators (1987), rules. 1, 2.
IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at General Standard 2(a).
Ibid. General Standard 2(b).
Ibid. General Standard 3(1).
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Among the many professional guidelines on arbitrator comportment, two of the
most influential include the IBA Guidelines 163 and the Code of Ethics issued
jointly by the American Arbitration Association and the American Bar
Association. 164 Whatever one's views about the wisdom of particular rules, most
informed observers recognise the rules' far-reaching effects, the latter principally
for domestic arbitration conducted within the United States and the former with
respect to most international commercial arbitral proceedings. For want of
anything better, they get pressed into service to fill the gaps left by overly vague
institutional rules or lack of foresight by the parties' advisers.
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(ii) US Rules
One frequently hears complaints about the 'Americanization' of arbitration, 171
connoting aggressive litigation tactics that include hefty boxes of unmanageable
exhibits, costly pretrial discovery, and disruptive objections to evidence. 172 One
also notes the internationalisation of US dispute resolution practices, as reflected in
greater use of written testimony and reasoned awards. 173

In cases of supervised arbitration under the rules of the AAA, ICC or LCIA, an institutional challenge will
usually be brought prior to any court action. See e.g., AT&T Corp. v. SaudiCable Co. [2000] 2Lloyd'sRep. 127
(CA) (Eng.), available at 2000 WL 571190, where following a mix-up with various versions of the
chairman's CV, a challenge was brought for failure to report a position on the board of directors of a
company that was in direct competition with the losing party in the arbitration. Ibid. 130. An unsuccessful
challenge before the ICC Court preceded an equally unfruitful attempt to have the award vacated in a
judicial action at the arbitral seat in London. Ibid. 138.
See IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at Pt II.
See e.g., Roger P. Alford, 'The American Influence on International Arbitration' in (2003) 19 Ohio St. J on Disp.
Resol. 69. This article forms part of a symposium issue, 'The Americanization of International Dispute
Resolution', which includes contributions by Susan Karamanian, Elena Helmer and Cesare Romano. The
wider influence of US law has also been noted by Bernard Audit in 'L'Americanisation du droit' in (2001)
45 Arch, philosophic du droit 7 (Fr.).
Not all US practices evoke disapproval, however. In a provocative article subtitled 'Why Civil Law
Arbitrators Apply Common Law Procedures', an eminent Zurich attorney studied the way some
Continental lawyers can be reborn to an appreciation of Anglo-American litigation techniques such as
cross-examination and document production. Markus Wirth, 'Ihr Zeuge, Herr Rechtsanwalt! Weshalb Civil
Law Schiedsrichter Common- Law-Verfahrensrecht anwenden?' in (Jan-Feb 2003) 1 £«'toArc/2 fir
Schiedsverfahren (Schieds V£ German Arb. J) 8-15.
See Paul D. Friedland and Ank Santens, 'The Internationalization of American Arbitration' in (2004) News
and Notes from Inst, for Transnat'l Arb. (Spring) 1. See generally, David Branson, 'American Party-Appointed
Partisan Arbitrators: Not the Three Monkeys' in (2004) 30 UDayton L Rev. 1; Friedland and Townsend, supra
n. 164; Bruce Meyerson and John M. Townsend, 'Revised Code of Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators
Explained'in (2004) Disp. Resol. J (February-April) 10; Sheppard, supra n. 164; Ben H. Sheppard,Jr,'A New
Era of Arbitration Ethics: the 2004 Revision to the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in
Commercial Disputes' in (2004) News and Notes from Inst, for Transnat'l Arb. (Spring) 1.
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the challenge. 169 In such instances, the relevant test will almost inevitably be
something along the lines of justifiable doubts in the mind of a reasonable person.
Excessive disclosure can cause as many problems as inadequate disclosure. If an
overscrupulous conscience announces links that would not normally raise
questions, this might cause parties to wonder whether there is more going on than
meets the eye.
One of the most useful (albeit controversial) features of the IBA Guidelines lies
in its enumeration of illustrative elements that create varied levels of arbitrator
disclosure. 170 A 'Red List' describes situations that give rise to justifiable doubts
about an arbitrator's impartiality. Some are non-waivable (such as a financial
interest in the outcome of the case), while others (such as a relationship with
counsel) may be ignored by mutual consent. An 'Orange List' covers scenarios
(such as past service as counsel for a party) that the parties are deemed to have
accepted if no objection is made after timely disclosure. Finally, a 'Green List'
enumerates cases (such as membership in the same professional organisation) that
require no disclosure.
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During the proceedings, arbitrators should not engage in ex parte communications about the case with
counsel. Nevertheless, some institutional rules remain silent on the matter. Notably, the International
Chamber of Commerce has shown itself reticent to publish an explicit prohibition. See Yves Derains and
Eric A. Schwartz, A Guide to the ICC Rules ofArbitration (2nd edn, 2005) 131-132; seealso,W. Laurence Craig,
William W. Park and Jan Paulsson, International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration (3rd edn, 2000), para. 13.07, p.
242 (seeming to acknowledge that a practice of ex parte communication might be agreed by the parties).
See Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes (1977), Canon VII. For a critique of the practice,
see Seth H. Lieberman, 'Something's Rotten in the State of Party-Appointed Arbitration: Healing ADR's
Black Eye that is "Nonneutral Neutrals" 'in (2004) 5 CardozoJ Conflict Resol. 215.
See AAA/ABA Code of Ethics, supra n. 18 at preamble to Canon X; see generally, 'Report to ABA House of
Delegates' in (2003/2004) InflArb. News (Winter) 15.
American Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, rule 18
(applicable unless there has been agreement otherwise) prohibits parties from communicating ex parte with
an arbitrator, except that parties may communicate with party-nominated (rather than presiding)
arbitrators (i) to describe the nature of the controversy; or (ii) to discuss selection of a presiding arbitrator.
AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures (2007), rule 18. Under rule 12(b), partynominated arbitrators must meet general standards of impartiality and independence unless there has been
agreement otherwise, as permitted by rule 17(a)(iii). Ibid, rule 12(b).
See e.g., Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005) (involving the controversial
California Ethical Standards for Neutral Arbitrators). In the case at bar, arising under the rules of the
National Association of Securities Dealers, the California standards were found to be pre-empted by the
1934 Securities Exchange Act. Ibid. 1121.
The College of Commercial Arbitrators has published useful commentary on the topic. SeeJames H. Carter
et at, 'Appointment, Disclosures and Disqualification of Neutral Arbitrators' in Guide to Best Practices in
Commercial Arbitration, supra n. 161 at pp. 7, 7-26. Other thoughtful observations can be found in Lawrence
W. Newman and Richard D. Hill (eds.), The Leading Arbitrators' Guide to International Arbitration (2nd edn, 2008),
with contributions by Gerald Aksen (ch. 2 'The Tribunal's Appointment'), Andreas Lowenfeld (ch. 3 'The
Party-Appointed Arbitrator') and Allan Philip (ch. 5 'The Duties of an Arbitrator').
Originally proposed in January 2008 by a subcommittee of the Arbitration Committee of the ABA Dispute
Resolution Section, the draft 'Best Practices for Meeting Disclosure Requirements' (often called simply the
'Disclosure Checklist') encountered considerable opposition from within both the ABA Section of
International Law and the College of Commercial Arbitrators. ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, Best
Practices for Meeting Disclosure Requirements Under the RUAA and Similar Arbitrator Disclosure
Standards (10 January 2008). In April 2009, the Council of the Dispute Resolution Section refused to
approve the draft.
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Perhaps the most striking example of internationalisation finds itself in the
evolution of arbitral ethics. Traditionally, US practice presumed party-nominated
arbitrators to be partisan, and thus permitted ex parte communication with their
appointers. 174 Arbitrators nominated by one side were expected to be non-neutral
unless explicitly agreed otherwise. 175
Most arbitration conducted within the United States was brought into line with
global standards requiring independence for all arbitrators. Under the 2004 joint
AAA/ABA Code of Ethics, a party-nominated arbitrator may be non-neutral only
if so provided by the parties' agreement, the arbitration rules or applicable law.176
The new attitude expressed in the Code was reinforced by changes in the
American Arbitration Association's domestic commercial arbitration rules,
effective July 2003, establishing a presumption of neutrality for all arbitrators. 177
These rules coexist along with idiosyncrasies of practice among particular
institutions and states. 178
Readers must be careful not to confuse the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics with
other US guidelines, 179 including recentiy abandoned proposals from within the
ABA for a 'disclosure checklist'.180 The risk in such guidelines, of course, is that an
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(g) Synthesising Legal Norms
Decisions of national courts, arbitral institutions and arbitrators (in the case of
ICSID proceedings) all contribute to the elaboration of what might be called a
jurisprudence of ethical standards. Those who must rule on disqualification
motions will inevitably seek some understanding of what others have done in
analogous cases. Although the decisions do not constitute binding precedent in the
sense of many national legal systems, they do provide an indication of what others
consider the right approach, and as such contribute to transnational ethical norms.
Admittedly, the practice of looking to different sources of authority will not be
satisfying to those who seek a hierarchy of clear authority within a single legal
jurisdiction. For better or for worse, however, no such unified judicial system
governs the world of international economic relations. 182 In the world as we find it,
an approach taking into consideration relevant national and administrative
practice will likely provide greater predictability and fairness than allowing each
challenge decision to be fashioned from whole cloth.
Grounds for challenge often present themselves with slight but relevant factual
variations. For example, conflicts decisions commonly address an arbitrator's
relationship with an institution or company that, in turn, has links to one of the

Mnemonic devices have occasionally been pressed into service. An acronym coined by a long forgotten
Bostonian runs through five elements for arbitrator disqualification, asking whether a financial or personal
relationship can be characterised as (i) substantial, (ii) continuing, (iii) recent, (iv) obvious and/or (v) direct.
The initial letters of each word spell 'SCROD', a name found on menus at New England restaurants to
describe a white fish in the cod or haddock family, served split and deboned. One might puzzle over the
attribute 'obvious', given that the temptation to defect from duty remains problematic even if occasioned by
an otherwise hidden relationship.
The closest approximation to a supreme court for international law might be found in the International
Court ofJustice (ICJ), a body with power to decide cases only when states accept jurisdiction through treaty
or declaration. See Statute of the International Court ofJustice, arts. 34-36, 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1055. In
diplomatic protection before the ICJ, foreign investors remain captive to the political predisposition of their
home countries. Even when a state agrees to sponsor a claim, the Court itself may find the connection
between the investor and the state insufficient to justify standing. See e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co.,
Ltd (Belgium v. Spain, Second Phase) [1970] ICJ 3 (5 February), available at 1970 WL 1 (ICJ) (forbidding
Belgium from espousing claim of Belgian shareholders in Canadian company). For a rare case in which the
ICJ did hear an investment dispute, see Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI) (United States v. Italy) [1989] ICJ 15
(20 July), (1989) 28 ILM 1109, available at www.icj-cij.org/docket/ files/76/6707.pdf (finding no host state
liability when Italy requisitioned US-owned plant to prevent liquidation). See generally, F.A. Mann, 'Foreign
Investment in the International Court of Justice' in (1992) 86 Am. J Int'l Law 92.
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unhappy loser in an arbitration might take inspiration from the checklist as a
roadmap for annulment motions. Like the mnemonic devices used by some
administrative staff at arbitral institutions, checklists and 'rules of thumb' should be
seen as starting points for analysis rather than black letter destinations. 181
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V. T H R E E R E C U R R I N G P R O B L E M S
(a) Trivial and 'De Minimis' Contacts
On a planet where butterflies flap wings in Africa so as to cause Canadian
snowstorms, clever minds can present scenarios under which most individuals
might be deemed less than virgin in attitude or predisposition. Experiences or
relationships might create distant but nevertheless worrisome relationships with
litigants. Some chance statement by the arbitrator might raise the prospect of
troubling predilections about controverted issues in the arbitration.
If a dispute resolution system aims to be useful in a professionally and
economically interdependent world, some principles of proportionality and
reasonable nexus must operate to triage between genuine and spurious
challenges. 185 Analysis does not end with the discovery of some remote link
between arbitrator and dispute. If assessments of arbitrator challenges were
entirely subjective, ethical standards would become irrelevant to any useful ethical
canons.
Notions of de minimis contacts, related to the proximity or intensity of the
troublesome relationship, have been called into service to evaluate an arbitrator's

In this respect, several challenges have been rejected with respect to an arbitrator's membership on the
board of a Swiss bank that managed pension funds and whose portfolio contained shares of one of the
parties. See Suez v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17 (claimant Suez, Aguas de Barcelona and
InterAguas Servicios); Suez v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 (claimant Suez, Vivendi and Aguas de
Barcelona); Electricidad Argentina SA v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/22 (claimant Electricidad
Argentina and EDFI); EDF International SA v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23 (claimant EDF
International SA, SAUR International SA and Leon Participaciones Argentinas SA).
In a dispute implicating a manufacturer of household appliances, an arbitrator who owns a dishwasher
made by the manufacturer would present a very different position from that of an arbitrator who served as
corporate secretary. An arbitrator who serves on the board of a company with 100,000 customers (one of
whom has a link with an affiliate of the respondent) would pose different concerns from those obtaining if
the respondent's affiliate was the principal customer.
In this connection, one remembers the delightful tirade in Moliere's Don Juan when the valet Sganarelle
proves the inevitability of his master's damnation by invoking a series of causal links, each plausible on its
own, but together reaching a conclusion in no way justified by the reasoning. The bird clinging to a branch
reminded Sganarelle of the duty to cling to moral precepts, and then led him through sky, sea, ships, earth
and beasts to the conclusion that his miscreant philandering boss was lost forever, which in any event was the
place that the scandalised wanted to reach from the beginning. Moliere, Don Juan, Act 5, sc. 2.
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parties in the case. 183 The potential for taint will depend on the specific nature and
intensity of the relationship, whether as director, owner, counsel or customer. 184
In an effort to guide both arbitrators and litigants, at least one arbitral
institution has published sanitised versions of its challenge decisions. A
compendium of challenges under the rules of the LCIA groups the various
grounds for disqualification, including the two general rubrics of impartiality or
independence, as well as the British formulation of a 'duty to act fairly between the
parties'.
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A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances:...
(2) The judge knows that the judge . . . has more than a de minimis interest that could be
substantially affected by the proceeding. 189

The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct defines de minimis to mean 'an
insignificant interest that could not raise a reasonable question regarding the
judge's impartiality'. 190 It also defines 'economic interest' to mean ownership 'of
more than a de minimis legal or equitable interest'.191 In applying this principle, the
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct states that an economic interest does not
include an interest in 'a mutual or common investment fund'.192
Other jurisdictions with developed arbitration laws take a similar perspective. In
ATTv. Saudi Cable Co., the English Court of Appeal had to consider the effect of an

1

188

189

191
192
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allegedly disqualifying links with one side. 186 In this connection, the IBA
Guidelines attempt to provide concrete criteria forjudging arbitrator relationships
and predispositions. General Standard 2 of the Guidelines obliges arbitrators to
resign if they know of facts or circumstances which, from a reasonable person's
point of view, give rise to 'justifiable doubts' about the arbitrators' impartiality or
independence. 187 In defining justifiable doubts, Standard 2(d) speaks of a
'significant' economic or personal interest, not fany' interest. 188
Looking to national law for analogies, a de minimis standard can also be found in
Canon 2 of the American Bar Association 2007 Model Code of Judicial Conduct
, which requires a judge to perform the duties of judicial office impartially,
competentiy and diligently. Following this general Canon, the ABA Model Code
provides as follows:

See the concurring opinion in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968),
where Justice White considered it enough that the challenged arbitrator had done 'more than trivial
business' with one of the parties. Ibid. 152 (White J, concurring). This test was adopted recently by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Applied Industrial Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, AS, 492
F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2007). See also, decisions dismissing the challenges in ICSID cases ARB/03/17 (Suez, Aguas
de Barcelona and Interagua Servicios v. Argentina) and ARB/03/19 (Suez, Vivendi and Aguas de Barcelona v. Argentina)
In their decision of 12 May 2008, the remaining arbitrators identified four criteria relevant to their
colleague's links with the party that had nominated her: (i) proximity of the connections; (ii) intensity of
interaction; (iii) dependence on the party by virtue of benefits said to have been conferred; and (iv)
materiality of any benefits allegedly accruing to the arbitrator. The challenge was based on the challenged
arbitrator's position as a director of a Swiss bank that apparently held portfolio investments in small
amounts of the claimant companies.
Standard 2(a) speaks of the arbitrator's subjective 'doubts' while Standard 2(b) refers to an objective test
based on a 'reasonable third person's point of view'. IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at General Standards 2(a),
2(b).
A comment to General Standard 6 discussing troublesome relationships throws further light on the overlap
of arbitrators' interests with those of their law firm. Explanation 6(a) states that 'the activities of the
arbitrator's firm should not automatically constitute a conflict of interest'. Rather, each firm activity must be
considered in the individual case. IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at General Standard 6 cmt (a).
ABA Model Code ofJudicial Conduct (2007), rule 2.11.
Ibid. Terminology.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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(b) Saying Too Much Too Early
Arbitrators may be challenged not just for pecuniary or personal links with one
side to the dispute, but also when their conduct creates an objective impression of
having prejudged a case. For example, a procedural order might express
conclusions about a matter that has not yet been the subject of evidentiary
hearings, such as reference to ownership of contested property.
Whether or not such expressions of opinion taint the arbitrator depends very
much on the facts and circumstances of each case. The context of the order might
make clear that ownership was presumed merely for the sake of determining
whether to grant interim relief to prevent assets from being diverted. The
offending language might be tentative and primafacie with no intention of depriving
either side of a full and fair hearing on the matter, and inserted in an order with
qualifying language such as 'if so decided by the Tribunal' or 'on the assumption
that Claimant is ultimately found to be the owner'.
Prejudgment causes problems under both the statutory provisions of developed
legal systems and the rules of most arbitral institutions. The interaction of these
rules might be illustrated by a hypothetical arbitration in London. The English
Arbitration Act 1996 establishes mandatory norms that an arbitral tribunal shall
'act fairly and impartially as between the parties, giving each party a reasonable
opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his opponent'. 194 A rich
English case law on 'apparent bias' makes clear that justice must not only be done,
but must be seen to be done. 195 Among the tests proposed by judicial and scholarly
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arbitrator's ownership of shares in a telecommunications company in competition
with one of the parties. Any benefit from the arbitration's outcome that could
indirectly accrue to the company whose shares were owned by the arbitrator was
deemed 'of such minimal benefit to [the arbitrator]' that the court held it
unreasonable to conclude that the arbitrator's share ownership would be a
relevant influence.193 An insignificant ownership interest in a company will not be
cause for disqualification.
The costs of an absolutist perspective will often outweigh any advantages. If
ethical standards did not include some notion of triviality, it would be unduly easy
to derail arbitration by asserting a tenuous connection between arbitrators and
facts that might arguably have an effect on their decisions. A 'no-link-too-small'
theory would permit removal of arbitrators simply because they occasionally
socialised with colleagues from the host state. The damage to the stability and
efficiency of the arbitral process would affect all those who depend on it to provide
relatively fair and neutral adjudication.

AT&T Corp. v. Saudi Cable Co. [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 127, para. 43(c) (CA) (Eng.), available at 2000 WL
571190.
Arbitration Act 1996, s. 33(1) (Eng.).
Cases include R v. Sussex Justices [1924] 1 KB 256; Locabail Ltd v. Bayfield Properties Ltd [2000] 1 All ER 65; R
v. Gough [1993] AC 646 (HL); In re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No. 2) [2001] 1 WLR 700 (CA);
Porter v. Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 (HL); ASM Shipping Ltd v. TTMI Ltd [2005] EWHC (Coram) 2238; National
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(c) Barristers
(i) Shared chambers

To the extent London remains one of the great centres for private dispute
resolution, the role of British barristers takes on a special significance for
international arbitration. In at least one investor—state case, an arbitral tribunal
itself held that a barrister should not appear as counsel before another member of
his chambers. 199 Although free to select its lawyers prior to constitution of the
arbitral tribunal, the respondent was not entitled to change the composition of its
legal team in a way that might imperil the tribunal's legitimacy.200 The tribunal
found no absolute bar to barristers from the same chambers being involved as
counsel and arbitrator in the same case, but found equally no absolute rule to the
opposite effect. Consequently, the justifiability of an apprehension of bias would
depend upon 'all relevant circumstances'. 201
Barristers, the arm of the legal profession most often charged with actually
arguing cases, traditionally practise from 'chambers' that bear both similarities
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pronouncements, one that commends itself looks to see whether the circumstances
of the case would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there
was a real danger that the tribunal was biased.
Institutional rules often applied in London follow similar lines. The LCIA Rules
provide that an arbitrator may be considered unfit if he or she 'does not act fairly
and impartially as between the parties', 196 and that an arbitrator may be
challenged if 'circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his
impartiality or independence'. 197 Bias under that text includes prejudgment of an
issue, in the sense of deciding without giving each side an opportunity to present its
case. 198

Assemblyfor Wales v. Condron [2006] EWCA(Civ) 1573; Hagop Ardahalian v. Unifert International SA (The Elisssar)
[1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 206 (QB); AWG Group Ltd v. Morrison [2006] EWCA (Civ) 6; Modern Engineering (Bristol)
Ltd v. C. Miskin and Son Ltd [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 135 (CA); R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate,
Pinochet M. 2 [2000] 1 AC 199 (HL); Gillies \. Secretary of Statefor Work and Pensions [2006] 1 WLR 781 (HL);
and Flaherty v. National Greyhound Racing Club [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1117. See also discussion supra.
LCIA Arbitration Rules, art. 10.2.
Ibid. art. 10.3.
Sometimes it is said that a party-nominated arbitrator should possess maximum predisposition and
minimum bias. Although the value of this unduly cute saying remains doubtful, it is true that for
international arbitration, the party-nominee often plays a special role in assisting the presiding arbitrator to
understand arguments that may otherwise be less accessible, due to differences in legal culture.
Hrvatska Elektroprivreda, ddv. Slovenia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24 (2008) (implicating claims by a Croatian
entity before a tribunal composed of David Williams (Chairman), Jan Paulsson and Charles Brower). It was
determined that David Mildon (appointed co-counsel of the respondent) could not participate further in the
case because Messrs Mildon and Williams were both members of Essex Court Chambers.
Article 56 of the ICSID Convention stresses the stability of properly constituted tribunals, providing that a
tribunal's composition shall remain unchanged except for death, incapacity or resignation. ICSID
Convention, Art. 56. The continued appearance of Mr Mildon might have undermined the legitimacy of
the tribunal by giving an appearance of impropriety, or by requiring resignation of Mr Williams, the
tribunal's Chairman.
Hrvatska Elektroprivreda, supra n. 199, Decision on Jurisdiction para. 31.
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(ii) International Bar Association Guidelines
The position under English law is what it is. 204 This does not prevent justifiable
doubts from arising among parties to international arbitration concerning
independence as between two barristers of the same chambers in a single
proceeding. Under the IBA Guidelines, the 'Orange List' Section 3.3 includes

See e.g., R. Pillai, 'Independence and Impartiality: the Situation of English Barristers Acting in Arbitrations'
in (2008) Transnat'l Disp. Mgmt (July), www.transnational- dispute-management.com/ (subscription only);
David Branson, 'Note on Hrvatska Elektropriveda v. Republic of Slovenia' in (2009) 25 Arb. Int'l. 615.
Sceptics also note that salaried legal associates in the United States and other countries assume the conflicts
of their firm affiliation even without sharing in profits.
At least one English case has rejected a challenge to an arbitrator who shares chambers with a barrister
serving as advocate in the same case. See Laker Airways Inc. v. FLS Aerospace Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 45 (QB)
(judgment of RixJ, as he then was). A more nuanced view, however, may be evolving. See e.g., Smith v. Kvaemer
Cementation Foundations Ltd [2006] EWCA (Civ) 242, [2006] 3 All ER 593 (CA) (involving litigation for
personal injuries sustained in a road accident). Both sides' barristers and the Recorder (legal officer acting
as magistrate within a given locality) were from the same chambers. On appeal from a judgment against the
claimant Smith, the Court of Appeal expressed concern that the claimant's barrister had not properly
explained to his client the complexity of the matter. The judgment was reversed, with Mr Smith's waiver
found to be ineffective.
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and differences when compared with law firms in general. The chambers include
shared office space and administrative assistants styled as clerks, as well as the
normal amenities of law practice such as word processors, fax machines and
photocopiers. Younger lawyers receive guidance and referrals from more senior
members.
Most barristers seem to reject application of the conflict-of-interest rules that
would normally be relevant to practice within a law firm. Considering themselves
independent and self-employed, sharing expenses but not revenues, 202 barristers
see no reason why two members of the same chambers should refrain from acting
for opposite sides of an arbitration, or why one should not sit as arbitrator in a case
where another serves as advocate.
Not all are convinced, however, that the integrity of proceedings remains
uncompromised when barristers from one set of chambers serve as arbitrator and
counsel in the same arbitration. Shared profits are not the only type of professional
relationships that can create potential conflicts. Senior barristers often have
significant influence on the progress of junior colleagues' careers. Moreover,
London chambers increasingly brand themselves as specialists in particular fields,
with senior 'clerks' taking on marketing roles for the chambers, sometimes
travelling to stimulate collective business. Moreover, a barrister's success means an
enhanced reputation, which in turn reflects on the chambers as a whole. 203
In response to doubts about the ethics of their practice, some barristers suggest
that outsiders just do not understand the system, characterising the critiques as
naive. Like a Paris waiter impugning a tourist's ability to speak French in order to
distract him from insisting on the correct change, the critique aims to camouflage
what is at stake. Often, however, outsiders do understand the mechanics of
chambers. They simply evaluate the dangers differently.
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(Hi) Collegiality and the 'outside' arbitrator

When barristers from the same chambers oppose each other as advocates, each
wants to show special cleverness. Competitive juices work against inappropriate
behaviour. Incentives to deviate from duty normally remain outweighed by the
goal of proving oneself the better gladiator. Similar considerations reduce risks
when one barrister serves as arbitrator while another (from the same chambers)
acts as counsel.
Different factors operate, however, when two barristers from the same chambers
sit together as arbitrators and exclude meaningful participation by the third
member of the tribunal. 211 Their bilateral deliberations remain outside the reach

IBA Guidelines, supra n. 15 at Pt II, s. 3.3.
Ibid. General Standard 4(a).
Ibid. Pt II, s. 3.3.1.
Ibid. Pt II, s. 3.3.3.
Ibid. Pt II, s. 3.3.2.
Otto L.O. de Witt Wijnen et al., 'Background Information on the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in
International Arbitration' in (2004) 5 Bus. L Int'l 433 at pp. 455^156, available at www.ibanet.org/images/
downloads/Background%20 Information.pdf. The IBA Working Group notes the distinction between the
operation of law firms and barristers chambers (including differences among barristers in different
jurisdictions) but then adds: 'in light of the content of the promotional material which many chambers now
disseminate, there is an understandable perception that barristers' chambers should be treated the same way
as law firms'. Ibid. p. 455.
The situation is more troubling in some types of disputes than in others. For example, in 'Bermuda Form'
insurance arbitrations, the insurers invariably appoint a senior barrister, and often insist on another barrister
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relationships 'between an arbitrator and another arbitrator or counsel'.205 As
mentioned earlier, this non-exhaustive iteration of various fact patterns covers
common scenarios that, depending on the circumstances of each case, might give
rise to justifiable doubts as to arbitrator impartiality or independence in the eyes of
the parties. The arbitrator thus has a duty to disclose problematic facts, which the
parties are deemed to have accepted if no timely objection is made following
disclosure.206
The Orange List's broad category of'[r]elationship[s] between an arbitrator
and another arbitrator or counsel' is amplified by Section 3.3.1, which includes a
situation where 'the arbitrator and another arbitrator are lawyers in the same law
firm'.207 This is supplemented in Section 3.3.3 by a further enumeration of
troublesome relationships, to include an arbitrator who was 'within the past three
years a partner or colleague of, or otherwise affiliated with, another arbitrator or
any of the counsel in the same arbitration'. 208
A special provision covers barristers, however. The Orange List, a nonexhaustive enumeration of fact patterns that 'may' give rise to justified doubts,
includes the following relationship: 'The arbitrator and another arbitrator or the
counsel for one of the parties are members of the same barristers' chambers'. 209
The IBA Guidelines' inclusion of this category was not without debate or
objection, and became the subject of a discussion in the 'Background' report issued
by the IBA Working Group. 210
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VI. I N T E L L E C T U A L I N T E G R I T Y
(a) Baby Splitting
Even if not biased or corrupt, arbitrators may lack intellectual integrity if they fail to
decide disputes according to the mission conferred upon them by the parties. If
evidence indicates that a clearly right answer to a dispute does exist, arbitrators
deviate from duty if they render compromise decisions without being so authorised
by the parties.
In this connection, one sometimes hears complaints of 'splitting the baby', a
reference to awards not justified by facts or law. 213 One strain in US legal literature
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of party scrutiny. The junior of the two barristers might draft the award for the
senior to present as 'our award' to the third arbitrator, followed perhaps by a
perfunctory conference call replacing genuine deliberations.
When a same-chambers relationship is apparent from the start, the litigants will
have renounced any objection to composition of the tribunal as such. This does not
mean, however, that they waive integrity and good faith in the tribunal's internal
communications, which form an essential part of due process. Parties who stipulate
three arbitrators have a right to expect that all will be allowed to participate in
discussions.
Exclusion of the third arbitrator derives not from any inherent wickedness in the
two affiliated barristers, but from the moral hazard implicit in any hidden in-group
complicity and facilitated by the confidential nature of deliberations. Enlightened
English arbitrators will remain concerned to avoid the appearance of impropriety
in dealings with each other. Nevertheless, when busy barristers have the
opportunity to save time by deciding as a two-some, the temptation exists that a
'short-on-time' card will be played to justify procedural irregularity, much as a
street thief might invoke the 'short-on-cash' defence to explain bag snatching. 212

as chairman. The dispute resolution clauses in such cases represent a compromise between the American
policy-holders and the non-American insurance companies, with London as the situs and New York law as
applicable to the merits of contract interpretation. The insurers' reasoning runs that an English barrister is
needed to understand how to conduct a London proceeding. The logic is not self-evident, given that the
English Arbitration Act 1996 imposes no preference whatsoever for English rules on procedural and
evidential matters, but leaves them to the discretion of the tribunal and the parties. Arbitration Act 1996, s.
34 (Eng.). On 'Bermuda Form' arbitration, see generally, Richard Jacobs et al., Liability Insurance in International
Arbitration: The Bermuda Form (2004).
On good practice in arbitral deliberations, see generally, Yves Derains, 'La pratique du delibere arbitral' in
Global Reflections on International Law, Commerce and Dispute Resolution: Liber Amicorum in Honour of Robert Briner
(2005), p. 221. M. Derains distinguishes between harmonious and pathological deliberations. In the latter
situation he suggests that a first draft of the award is to be prepared by the chairman alone, and presented
at a fixed meeting for deliberations. Ibid. para. 12, p. 229. Of course, a different practice may obtain when
informal discussions among the tribunal members lead to a consensus that the merits favour one side or the
other, or when issues can easily be parcelled for drafting after general agreement has been reached. All three
arbitrators may agree that no credible evidence supports the claim, or that one arbitrator has expertise that
can be pressed into service in drafting an award along lines previously accepted by all.
The imagery of baby-splitting seems to originate in the Biblical child custody dispute decided in ancient
Jerusalem by King Solomon. When one woman accused another of stealing her baby, the King called for a
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214

sword so the child might be divided in two, with one half for each woman. Of course, the metaphor hides
the character of Solomon's decision as an interim award, followed by grant of custody to the real mother
whose compassion led to abandonment of her claim in hopes of saving her son. 1 Kings 3:23-28.
See e.g., Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (2008), pp. 127-128 (asserting that courts and juries are 'more
likely to adhere to the law and less likely than arbitrators to "split the difference" between the two sides
thereby lowering damages' (quoting Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Services, 6 P. 3d 669, 693 (Cal.
2000))); see also, Alon Klement and Kvika Neeman, 'Does Private Selection Improve the Accuracy of
Arbitrators' Decisions' (28 March 2009) (workshop paper, on file with author).
A claimant awarded US$100 on a US$5 million claim 'wins' in the sense of receiving something. However,
the respondent would likely be the happier of the two parties. The distinction between rates of success in
proving liability and the amounts of awards is discussed more fully in Eisenberg and Hill, infra n. 216.
See Theodore Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill, 'Employment Arbitration and Litigation: An Empirical
Comparison' in (2003-2004) Disp. Resol. J (November-January) 44, looking at state and federal court trials
as compared with AAA arbitrations. In non-civil rights disputes, higher paid employees (earning over
US$60,000 per year) generally prevailed at greater rates (64 per cent) in arbitration than in state court
(56 per cent). For lower paid employees the win rate was 39 per cent. However, the size of the mean award
was greater in court cases, at US$462,000 for courts compared with US$211,000 for higher paid employees
in arbitration and US$30,000 for lower paid employees in arbitration. Looking to the median (rather than
mean) award, the higher paid employees actually received more in arbitration (US$94,000) than in court
litigation (US$68,000). Ibid.; see William M. Howard, 'Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination,
What Really Does Happen? What Really Should Happen?' in (1995) Disp. Resol. J (October-December) 40;
David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research'
in (2005) 57 Stan. LRev. 1557, 1567-1578; Adriaan Lanni, 'Case Note, Protecting Public Rights in Private
Arbitration' in (1998) 107 Yale LJ 1157.
Yet another category to consider would be 'grievance' cases arising pursuant to collective bargaining
agreements in the United States, often called 'labor union' arbitration. Some colleagues have suggested to
the author privately that arbitrators in 'grievance' cases sometimes endorse untruthful results as a
component of enhancing industrial cooperation and goodwill between company and union. In that context,
the arbitrator's role seems to include both a truth-seeking and a peace-making function.
It may be that obtaining legal counsel for court cases precludes the less wealthy from commencing litigation
except when attorneys will take matters on a contingency fee. More significantly perhaps, civil juries might
be unduly sympathetic to the 'little guy' (consumer or employee) in a battle against the 'big guy'
(manufacturer, bank or boss). In hearing a lender's claims against a borrower, it would not be surprising if
the jury included individuals who themselves had 'run-ins' with banks or brokers related to items such as
home mortgages, car loans or pension funds. Although not immune from such emotions, the arbitrators as
professional decision-makers might tend to decide more in tune with the evidence. If so, court damages
might be too high rather than arbitral damages too low. Finally, it may be that the legal cost of going to court
(which would arguably be greater than for arbitration, at least in the United States) imposes a certain
selection on the cases that are actually pushed to trial, with the employee less likely to find an attorney
willing to pursue small or doubtful claims on a contingency basis.
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suggests that arbitrators are pushed toward unprincipled decisions in order to
attract business through reappointment. 214
Although some arbitrators might behave that way, most remain puzzled by
assertions that 'incentives' promote improper comportment. No empirical data
permits a firm conclusion on the matter, at least not from variations in records of
'win rates' to the extent they can be determined 215 or the size of damages in
arbitration as opposed to court litigation. 216 Moreover, existing studies focus on
employment and consumer controversies, 217 which present concerns different from
those present in business-to-business cases. 218
As mentioned earlier, the contention that arbitrators render sloppy decisions
with the hope of greater gain for themselves runs counter to logic as well as
evidence, at least for complex international cases amongst sophisticated parties.
Successful arbitrators gain reputations by rendering awards that reflect fidelity to
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(b) Amiable Composition
In some circumstances, of course, the parties may in essence authorise compromise
by empowering the arbitrator to depart from the terms of the contract or the strict
rigours of otherwise applicable law. French law has long recognised the role of an
arbitrator authorised to act as an 'amiable compositeur', sometimes referred to as
'amiable composition', to describe the process rather than the person. 220 Such
power may be granted explicitly by contract, 221 or through incorporation by
reference to institutional rules such as those of the International Chamber of
Commerce. 222
The arbitrator authorised by the parties to act as amiable compositeur may
disregard or temper rules of law whose strict applications would violate equity
under the circumstances. 223 Examples include adjustment of payment date due to
substantial completion of construction projects, price changes due to alternation in
the fundamental economic balance between the parties, proportionality for
liquidated damages, adjustment of contract terms in the event of unexpected
inflation or exchange rate modification, and extension of statutes of limitation. 224
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the parties' shared ex ante expectations, establishing track records for
understanding difficult factual and legal matrices. Moreover, arbitrators sitting on
three-member tribunals have far more to gain from demonstrating intellectual
integrity to each other (thus enhancing positive references for future cases) than in
urging disregard of the right result. 219

Any 'horse trading' on a three-member tribunal will usually occur as accommodation on issues as to which
reasonable arbitrators might differ. In a construction case, for example, one arbitrator might see the
evidence of defective workmanship in the turbine blades, while another might not. The first arbitrator might
agree to reflect more on the turbine blades, while asking his colleagues to think again about her conclusions
on the quality of the cement mix. Such give-and-take represents no more than an attempt to reach consensus
on complex matters, thus permitting the type of unanimous award that more easily withstands potential
challenge.
See Nouveau code de procedure civile (NCPC), art. 1474 (Fr.), translated in The French Code of Civil Procedure
in English (Christian Dodd (trans.), 2005), applicable in purely domestic arbitrations, and NCPC, art. 1497,
applicable in international cases, defined to include arbitrations that 'implicate the interests of international
commerce'. NCPC, art. 1492 provides, 'Un arbitrage qui met en cause des interets du commerce
international'. Ibid. art. 1492.
For arbitration outside France, the role of amiable compositeur conferred by contract may assume less precise
contours than those provided under French law, a bit like the way 'due process' has come to be used in
transborder arbitration with a meaning that does not necessarily coincide with its significance in the United
States Constitution.
ICC Rules, art. 17(3), allows arbitrators to assume the powers of amiable compositeur only if agreed by the
parties.
See generally, Eric Loquin, L'amiable composition en droit compare et international: Contribution a I'etude du non-droit da
l'arbitrage commercial (1980) (Fr.) (proposing in the title an interesting juxtaposition by the use of non-droit
(non-law) after the colon and droit compare (comparative law) before); see also, Craig, Park and Paulsson, supra
n. 174 at para. 8.05, pp. 110-114; Jean-Louis Delvolve et al, French Arbitration Law and Practice (2003), paras
276-295, pp. 151-161.
For an empirical study of decisions ex aequo et bono (as discussed infra, a close cousin or even sister to amiable
composition), see Martim Delia Valle, Decisoes por Equidade na Arbitragem Comercial Internacional (doctoral thesis,
University of Sao Paulo, May 2009), ch. 8, pp. 372-402 (copy on file with author), translated in On Decisions
ex Aequo et Bono in International Commercial Arbitration (2009), ch. 8, pp. 188-121.
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Some commentators suggest that amiable composition would permit avoidance of what they term 'technical
legal constraints' in order to reach 'conclusions that are fair and just'. See Wells and Ahmed, supra n. 87 at p.
294. One wonders from whose perspective (investors or host states) the 'fair and just' label would be applied.
Only in a very limited sense does amiable composition overlap notions of public policy. Although policy
serves as a defence to contract claims, its function lies not in doing justice but in making sure a contract is
not enforced in a way that violates the forum's most basic notions of justice and morality. Public policy has
long been seen as an 'unruly horse' in that once astride the animal, we never know where it will carry us. See
Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 2 Bing. 229 at 252, in which one Captain Richardson sued for reinstatement as
master of the ship Minerva, which respondent appears to have given to his nephew, allegedly contravening a
policy of that day against selling command of important vessels.
ICC Rules, art. 17(3) mentions both the role of an amiable compositeur and ex aequo et bono in the same
sentence, speaking of a tribunal that shall 'assume the powers of an amiable compositeur' or 'decide ex aequo et
bono'. ICC Rules, art. 17(3). The French version follows a similar structure: 'Le tribunal arbitral statue en
amiable compositeur ou decide ex aequo et bono'. In this connection, art. 17 mentions both 'amiable
compositieur' and 'ex aequo et bono' in the same sentence, speaking of a tribunal that shall 'assume the powers of
an amiable compositeur' or 'decide ex aequo et bono'. Ibid. The French version follows a similar structure: 'Le
tribunal arbitral statue en amiable compositeur ou decide ex aequo et bono'. This construction seems to
leave open more than one reading. In some instances, 'or' joins distinct notions ('arbitrators may decide
according to law or according to equity'), while on other occasions, 'or' simply suggests slight variations on
roughly the same theme ('citizens may worship according to the dictates of their personal faith or belief
system').
A slightly different perspective is taken in Philippe Fouchard et al., Traite de I'arbitrage commercial international
(1996), para. 1502, pp. 836-837.. The authors seem to admit the negative manner for defining amiable
composition, and the option either to proceed direcdy to justice or first to consider the applicable law.
Nevertheless, they suggest that such a nuance lacks significance ('une telle distinction . . . paraft artificielle')
because the arbitrators can always do what they think justice requires.
See Matthieu de Boisseson, Le droit Jrancais de I'arbitrage (1990), para. 371, p. 315 (suggesting that equity
remains the goal ('le but') not the means (' [le] moyen') of amiable composition).
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In stipulating to amiable composition, parties pursue a different sort of truth from
what would otherwise be sought by those deciding the dispute. 225 Rather than
aiming at legal accuracy, the arbitrators reach toward general notions of 'right'
encrusted with emotional overtones and sometimes in tension with court decisions,
statutes or strict contract terms. 226
A long-standing debate surrounds whether amiable composition amounts to the
same thing as decision-making ex aequo et bono, according to the 'right and good'.227
Although the terms are often used interchangeably, the notion of amiable
composition may connote a broader range of options. Arbitrators deciding in
amiable composition could go directly to their preferred solution without first
asking whether the applicable law produces a clearly unfair result. In the
alternative, they could start with a national law and then depart, if necessary, to
achieve the 'right' result. The latter approach defines amiable composition by a
negative, in that the arbitrators are not required to apply rules of law. By contrast,
the former path corresponds to ex aequo et bono in taking shape in a more positive
way, beginning and ending with the arbitrators' private sense of justice. 228
Of course, arbitrators can very well reach an equitable result by applying
applicable legal norms. In such instances there is no need to reinvent the wheel by
seeking some novel 'non-law' solution to the parties' problem. 229

Rectitude in International Arbitration

523

(c) Creeping Legalism

In this connection, one notes the discussion of what 'users' want from international arbitration, a topic
discussed in the CPR-sponsored International Dispute Negotiation (IDN) Podcast of 21 November 2008,
conducted by Michael Mcllwrath, Senior Counsel, Litigation for GE Infrastructure, Oil and Gas, based in
Florence, Italy. Mr Mcllwrath interviewed Mr Volker Mahnken, senior counsel of Siemens AG, with respect
to the article that the latter co-authored with Messrs Paul Hoebeck and Max Kroebke entitled 'Time for
Woolf Reforms in International Construction Arbitration' in (2008) 11 Int'lArb. L Rev. 84 at pp. 84—99. The
authors suggest some equivalent of the 1999 reform of civil procedure in England and Wales to address what
was perceived as dissatisfaction among the main consumers of international construction arbitration, which
is considered too long, too expensive and too adversarial. Proposed reforms include more intensive ('front
loaded') pleadings at an earlier stage and more aggressive case management by arbitrators. See Gerald F.
Phillips, 'Is Creeping Legalism Infecting Arbitration?' in (2003) Disp. Resol J (February-April) 37; David W.
Rivkin, 'Towards a New Paradigm in International Arbitration: the Town Elder Model Revisited' in (2008)
24 Art. Ml 375.
In commercial arbitration, the litigants are normally also the parties to the agreement giving rise to the
arbitrator's jurisdiction. By contrast, for treaty-based investor-state proceedings, the investor's home
country (not the investor) is the party to the BIT or free trade agreement, but not the arbitration itself. Thus,
pre-dispute expectations contemplate those shared by the two contracting states, each of which stand as
surrogates for the perspective of their own investors as well as interests related to their roles as host states.
See e.g., Jean-Claude Najar, 'Inside Out: a User's Perspective on Challenges in International Arbitration' in
(2009) 25 Arb. Int'l. 515, After cataloguing the defects of international arbitration today, the author
concludes, 'By whatever means necessary, arbitration needs to be repaired, to be returned to its simple
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Ironically, a parallel critique increasingly presents itself in connection with
arbitrators who allegedly show too much rigidity in their decision-making.
Mediation proponents often disparage arbitration as burdened with undue
formality, suggesting that the arbitral process has fallen prey to 'creeping
legalism'.230
Sometimes, of course, the critique will be justified. Few argue against the search
for better ways to balance fairness and efficiency, or suggest that corporate
managers should learn to relish the legal bills and waste of time on unnecessary
litigation. It is usually better to give peace a chance before starting litigation, and
often wise to avoid costly 'scorched earth' practices that have become legendary in
US courts.
On occasion, however, the critique forgets that impartial arbitrators must
establish the facts and ascertain the law by weighing evidence and listening to
argument. Arbitration aims at a binding result, as close as possible to the shared ex
ante expectations memorialised in the relevant contract or investment treaty. The
conscientious arbitrator will normally adopt procedures whose level of formality
withstands ethical scrutiny.231
Mediation is different, and can no more substitute for arbitration than a dinner
date can replace a wedding, or a train trip between Boston and Washington can
replace a flight between New York and Hong Kong. Arbitration aims at a binding
result imposed regardless of the parties' ex post will. Mediation succeeds only when
both sides agree.
Another seductive but problematic argument suggests that business managers
no longer want due process at the cost of simplicity. Rather, so the argument goes,
they just want a streamlined way out of their commercial mess. 232
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(d) Arbitrators and the Search for Truth
Matters that 'go without saying' often bear saying nevertheless. Any consideration
of arbitrator integrity reveals an intriguing intersection among three notions: due
process, conflicts of interest and the search for truth.
Arbitrators are supposed to arrive at some understanding of what actually
happened and what legal norms determine the parties' claims and defences. In
finding facts and applying law, arbitrators should aim at getting as near as
reasonably possible to a correct view of the events giving rise to the controversy,
and to consider legal norms applied in other disputes that raise similar questions.
This does not mean that arbitrators do not balance truth-seeking against other
goals. Indeed, they do so all the time, notably in connection with document
production (which competes with economy and speed) and attorney-client
privilege (which inhibits attempts to get at what corporate officers really knew).
However, such balancing of interests does not require abandonment of truthseeking as an aspiration.
Parties to commercial or investment disputes can always decide to resolve
matters through combat, rolling dice or consulting the entrails of a disemboweled
chicken. Duels, gambling and augury find little favour these days, however.
Arbitration usually imposes itself faute de mieux where mediation has failed and
neither side wants to end up in the other side's courts, thus attaching a premium
on the search for truth.
This trivial point, that arbitration implicates a reasoned evaluation of facts and
legal norms, explains why analogies to practices applicable in other types of
non-judicial dispute resolution usually fall short. 234 In choosing arbitration, the
foundations—speed, cost efficiency, and user-friendliness'. Of course, only time will tell how far in-house
counsel will go in accepting the 'whatever means necessary' when the fortunes of their own companies are
at stake.
In this connection, the American Arbitration Association through its affiliate International Centre for
Dispute Resolution (ICDR) has adopted default rules on information exchange making clear that parties to
ICDR arbitration should not expect US court-style discovery. See Guidelines for Arbitrators Concerning
Exchanges of Information (ICDR 2008), available at www.adr. org/si.asp?id=5288. For better or for worse,
neither the International Chamber of Commerce nor the London Court of International Arbitration has
followed suit with any similar guidelines.
See William W. Park, Truth-Seeking in International Arbitration, in The Search for Truth in Arbitration 1 (Swiss
Arbitration Association, 2011); see also, Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The JVew Litigation , 2010 U. Ill L.
Rev. 1 (January 2010), at 27-38.
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Such generalisations beg the more difficult question of what should happen
when no consensus can be reached on how to streamline. The two sides can always
simplify things in a post-dispute procedural agreement. Often, however, the
hypothetical 'they' who seek simplicity turns out not to be the third person plural
at all. Instead, one side advocates some procedural measure that the other side
resists as fundamentally unfair. Absent both sides' consent to simplified procedural
protocols, ethical arbitrators must seek the best indication of the parties' shared ex
ante procedural expectations as memorialised in their arbitration clause and the
context of their dispute. 233
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VII. T H E OBJECT O F A N A R B I T R A T O R ' S D U T I E S
In a world lacking global commercial courts of mandatory jurisdiction, 236
arbitration provides one way to bolster confidence in cross-border economic
cooperation. Without binding private dispute resolution, many business
transactions would remain unconsummated from fear of the other side's
hometown justice. Or, they would be concluded at higher costs to reflect the
greater risk due to the absence of adequate mechanisms to vindicate contract
rights or investment expectations.
In consequence, arbitrator integrity takes on significance not only for the direct
participants in cross-border trade and investment, but also for the wider global
community whose welfare is directly affected by the arbitral process. Even if
universally accepted standards of conduct remain elusive, all communities
implicated by cross-border arbitration must continue a dialogue on the subject that
at the least will help to identify wrong directions and false solutions.
Arbitration's broader impact raises propositions of whether an arbitrator's
ethical obligations flow to society at large rather than simply to the litigants. The
answer, perhaps unsatisfying to ideologues, remains 'sometimes'.
As an initial matter, one must be cautious about unselective attempts to
transplant judicial standards into the world of arbitration. Given a judge's clear
obligations to the citizenry as a whole, the calculus ofjudicial duties will differ from
what might be expected of arbitrators who remain principally (albeit not
exclusively) creatures of the litigants' contracts.
For example, if urged by parties mindful of costs, an arbitrator might accept
proceedings with reduced due process, even if not willing to go so far as looking
into a crystal ball. By contrast, a judge may not feel comfortable abandoning

In practice, of course, a corporate officer may decide to resist compromise under the assumption that his
company has a stronger position than the adversary, coming to regret that decision only when the arbitral
tribunal finds for the other side.
Regional bodies such as the European Court ofJustice do exist in the context of treaties for economic union,
but would have no authority, for example, in a dispute between a French societe anonyme and an American
corporation, or between a Chinese trading entity and a Brazilian Sociedad Limitada.
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parties have not sought simply to make peace, noble as that goal might be. Rather,
they have committed to a decision-making process founded on a search for an
accurate portrayal of the facts and the law. Business managers who want simply to
reach a solution to their conflict can always agree to a decision that ignores the law
and the facts.
Arbitrators normally have no power to rewrite the parties' agreement, even if
one side regrets having agreed to arbitration. 235 The common sense of this
hypothesis can be tested if one imagines the surprise of a corporate general counsel
who, believing she had a 'good case' on the law, facts and contract interpretation,
received an award stating that the arbitrator had decided to grant each side half of
what it requested because that seemed like the fair thing to do.
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state-imposed procedural mandates, even if so requested by litigants seeking a
cheaper and quicker process. The state that pays the judge's salary sets the broad
contours of the relevant procedure. Of course, there are limits to what arbitrators
will do at the request of parties. Few will condone arbitration as a tool for money
laundering 237 or proceedings designed to falsify what actually happened. 238
In most instances, public and private goals will coincide, with each having a very
real interest in the systemic integrity of the arbitral process. Seeking to decide
disputes fairly as between the parties, arbitrators will normally adopt practices that
comport with public concerns about basic procedural due process. The just
enforcement of private contracts will normally promote the societal interest in
promise-keeping and respect for bargains that underpin most cross-border
commercial or financial cooperation.
Arbitrators thus bear a responsibility of the utmost seriousness to be mindful of
the integrity of their proceedings when seeking an optimum balance between
fairness and efficiency. Those who break faith with this duty make the world a
poorer place.

To move embezzled funds abroad, a corrupt official might conclude a contract with a foreign entity,
controlled by the official's equally corrupt colleagues overseas. When the government fails to perform its
obligations, arbitration, sometimes with honest arbitrators unaware of what has happened, would lead to an
award whose execution ultimately implicates an unlawful transfer of funds abroad. For one case raising such
suspicions, see Gulf Petro Trading Co., Inc. v. Nigerian National Petroleum Corp., 512 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2008),
discussed in Thomas Walsh, 'Collateral Attacks and Secondary Jurisdiction in International Arbitration' in
(2009)25 4r*. 7 s m 3 3 .
A recent California case illustrates the potential for misuse of the arbitral process in employment law. Nelson
v. Am. Apparel, Inc., No. B205937, 2008 WL 4713262 (Cal. Ct. App. October 28, 2008). The case implicated
the founder of American Apparel, reported to have been the object of at least three sexual harassment
lawsuits. In one, a strange piece of post-setdement theatre involved payment of more than US$ 1 million to
an employee who apparendy accepted a sham arbitration by a retired judge whose 'award' would stipulate
facts and findings in the company's favour.

